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1 Executive Summary 
Overall, it appears that pension issues during the last years only got debated more intensely by 
the most important decision makers in office when they were constrained to do so for reasons 
for short- to mid-term financial sustainability. The latter holds for the reforms of early 
retirement “due to very long insurance periods” (i.e. of the so-called “Hacklerregelung”), and 
the reform of invalidity pensions, both decided in late 2010, and as well for the rather 
encompassing list of measures decided in early 2012 within a so-called “consolidation 
package”, following the aim to consolidate public budgets. Some of the most important 
measures regarding pensions within this “consolidation package” are beyond standard 
indexation of pension benefits in 2013 and 2014, tightening access to early retirement 
according to the so-called pensions corridor, a partial reform of part-time allowance for older 
workers and different reform steps regarding invalidity pensions. Overall, these measures 
follow two main goals: cost containment on the one side and increasing the actual retirement 
age on the other side, both being the topics most widely discussed in Austria in respective 
debates during recent years. In autumn 2013, further reforms got discussed within the 
coalition negotiations between the Social Democratic Party (SPÖ) and the Peoples’ Party 
(ÖVP), taking place after the national elections of September 2013. Both of them first agreed 
to maintain silence on the content and outcomes of negotiations until all chapters of the 
coalition pact are completed. However, some issues discussed were made public. Plans 
announced included to retrench very high pensions deriving from special schemes (like the 
one of the Austrian National Bank, the Austrian Federal Railways, the Social Insurance 
Providers or for former politicians) to some degree via a constitutional bill. Furthermore, 
according to media reports, the ÖVP proposed to bring forward the alignment of the statutory 
retirement age of women towards the one of men by some years. However, the SPÖ continued 
to reject such plans. Finally, the new government programme did not turn out to be very 
concrete on specific reforms in the area of pensions, but more addresses areas were future 
reforms should be envisaged and elaborated over the next years. However, at the same time 
rather ambitious targets got formulated regarding the goal to increase actual retirement age. 
A number of other challenges evident within the policy area of pensions have not or only 
rudimentarily been addressed more recently, both in terms of debates and actual measures 
decided. This holds true, for example, for the question of adequacy of minimum pensions (in 
terms of poverty prevention), for questions of the (rather low) intragenerational distributional 
impact of the pension system and regarding high gender differences in benefit levels. 
A related development has for a long time been evident concerning health care. Here, debates 
and reforms until recently had their focus on financial sustainability, whereas at the same time 
it appeared that decision makers largely took it for granted that the Austrian health system 
guarantees a high degree of accessibility and high quality services. It is fair to say that reforms 
decided in 2009 and implemented during 2010 and 2011 were rather successful in improving 
the financial situation of the health insurance providers, of which some were said to be close 
to bankruptcy in 2008. However, for a long time hardly any progress was made regarding 
another long-standing challenge within the Austrian health system: the very complex structure 
of decision-making and financing that is supposed to result in substantial inefficiencies, 
especially regarding the hospital sector. A new attempt to deal with respective challenges has 
been made with the recent “Health Reform 2012/2013” (Gesundheitsreform 2012/2013). 
Apart of some more or less concretely defined goals, this reform at first instance comprises 
institutional and procedural reforms, where it has to be awaited if and to what degree they 
really achieve the intended effects. The reform comes with a new structure of “joint planning 
and responsibility”, were both at the national level and at the level of the federal provinces 
representatives of the national state, the federal provinces and the health insurance providers 
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are represented in joint commissions, responsible for planning in the health sector and quality 
assurance. These commissions develop and decide on one national and nine regional (i.e. 
addressing reforms at the level of the federal provinces) “target-management contracts” 
(“Zielsteuerungsverträge”), enclosing infrastructure development, quality assurance and 
financing. Regarding financial sustainability, the different institutions involved agreed on a 
model where increases in health expenditure should not surpass the expected growth of 
nominal GDP. Independent experts on health care in their appraisal of the health reform 
2012/2013 come to different conclusions. Some argue that it lacks concrete measurable and at 
the same time ambitious goals. Others stress that it at least comes with a significantly 
increased transparency of planning in health care. Furthermore, they argue that actual reforms 
implemented according to the Regional Target-Management Contracts over the next three 
years may – at first sight – be of the type of “small steps reforms” only, but that these projects 
may lead to a process of more structural reform in the future. The new government 
programme only encloses some punctual new reform measures and at first instance one more 
lists the strategies and measures decided within the Health Reform 2012/2013. 
Political discourse on questions of long-term care gained some increased public visibility 
during the recent years. The initial background was a discussion about organisational features 
of the system of long-term care cash benefits which started by late 2010, and problems with 
short-term financial sustainability regarding intramural and extramural social services, to be 
organised and financed by the nine federal provinces. The result was a (overall not very 
broad) reform package, decided in spring 2011. Hereby, all competencies regarding cash 
benefits were bundled at the level of the central state and a “long-term-care fund” was 
introduced to safeguard the financing of respective social services until 2014. Within the 
consolidation package of 2012, the latter instrument was expanded until 2016 (by assigning 
additional funds). It is fair to say that these measures at first instance aimed at prevailing the 
status quo (even in times of tight budgets), but that, at the same time, they failed to address 
more structural problems of the Austrian LTC system. A working group got installed to come 
up with new proposals for a more structural reform of LTC back in earlier 2011 and presented 
its results by the end of 2012. The suggestions made were not very concrete regarding a 
number of issues, which especially holds for the point of a structural organisational reform, 
asking for more harmonization, but stating that this goal should be met via instruments of soft 
governance at first instance (increased information on the status quo, common goals on 
service supply and quality management, increased monitoring and evaluation etc.). 
Furthermore, the working group did not provide new models for public financing of long-term 
care. It only agreed that financing should come from general tax revenue, whereas it rejected 
the idea of a long-term care insurance, as this would lead to a further increase of non-wage 
labour costs. Overall, question of future organisation of long-term care is on the agenda to 
some degree, and the reform working group with its report at least helped to put some 
problems on the table. However, it is unclear if this will have a substantial effect on future 
developments in the field. Here, the most important retarding force, namely a fragmentation 
of competencies and accountability remains to be in place. This means that the 
implementation of the different suggestions made by the reform working group again depends 
on negotiations between the different stakeholders involved. Furthermore, if none of them 
takes over a kind of leading role, then it is very unlikely that respective reform procedures 
really gain momentum. Regarding long-term care the new government programme only 
provides rather general announcements to improve the quality of the existing system, but a 
large degree falls short to present concrete strategies and measures on how to achieve this 
goal. 




2.1 System description 
2.1.1 Major reforms that shaped the current system 
The history of the Austrian pensions system comprises more than 100 years of mostly path-
dependent development. The first milestone was the introduction of public old-age pensions 
for white collar employees of the private sector, introduced in 1909. Draft bills for other 
introduction of old-age pensions for a number of other professional groups where decided 
during the 1920s, but de facto not implemented until the Nazis took over power in 1938 and 
Austria got part of the German Reich. In 1939 the German Rules on Social Insurance got 
introduced in the former Austrian territory, among other introducing old-age pensions for blue 
collar workers. After WWII, for the time being many German regulations concerning social 
policy remained in place, however in conjunction with a number of important 
“Austrifications”, codified within the so-called Social Insurance Transition Act 
(Sozialversicherungs-Überleitungsgesetz 1947). Thereby important steps of adaptation were 
for example the re-introduction of so-called “self-government” within providers of social 
insurance and the establishment of the Main Association of Austrian Social Security 
Institutions (Hauptverband der Sozialversicherungsträger), since serving as a co-ordinating 
governance institution in the area of pensions, health insurance and accidents insurance. In 
1956, the General Social Security Act (Allgemeines Sozialversicherungsgesetz/ASVG) 
replaced the previously valid laws in the field of social security. It covers health, work 
accident and pension insurance for blue- and white-collar workers in industry, mining, 
commerce and trade, transport, agriculture and forestry, and it also regulates health insurance 
for pensioners. Pension insurance for self-employed (except of farmers) got introduced in 
1957, old-age benefits for farmers got stepwise expanded as from 1958, with pension 
insurance comparable to other professions decided in 1969 (and implemented as from 1971). 
Since the 1980s, the pension system underwent several reforms. The reforms of 1985 and 
1988 aimed at general cost-containment, e.g. by making the benefit formula less generous 
(see e.g. Mairhuber 2003). The reforms of the 1990s (1992, 1993, 1996, 1997) generally 
pointed towards the same direction. One important alteration deriving from the reforms 
1992/1993 which is still in place is the stepwise increase of the statutory retirement age of 
women from 60 to 65 years, to be implemented stepwise between 2024 and 2034. Further 
reforms were decided in 2000, 2003 and 2004 (see e.g. Mairhuber 2003; Fink 2009 and Knell 
et al. 2006), enclosing an abolition of specific types of early retirement and aiming at mid- to 
long-term cost containment via more structural reforms and harmonization of pensions of 
civil servants towards other old-age pensions. Later reforms were of gradual nature, at first 
instance trying to reduce inflow to different forms of early retirement and invalidity pension. 
 
2.1.2 System characteristics 
The by far most important source for the provision of retirement income in Austria is the so-
called “statutory pension system” (“Gesetzliche Pensionsversicherung”), which is the first 
pillar of the Austrian pension system (see e.g. BMASK 2012b, 29ff.). It provides old-age 
pensions, surviving dependents’ pensions, as well as invalidity pensions. Schemes of the 
second and third pillar are occupational pensions based on works agreements, the so-called 
“new severance pay scheme” and private savings, where public subsidies are available within 
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a scheme called “premium-aided pension savings scheme”. However, schemes of the second 
and third pillar have a rather limited role in overall provisions (see below for more details).  
Today, the statutory pension system includes, in principle, all people in gainful employment
1
 
(including most categories of self-employed), with the exception of civil servants, who have 
traditionally been covered by their own systems. However, under the Act on the 
“Harmonisation of Austrian Pension Systems”, which took effect on 1 January 2005, uniform 




The Austrian statutory pension system is an earnings-related unfunded scheme, organised on a 
PAYG-basis and at first instance financed by insurance contributions, amounting to 22.8% of 
gross earnings of employed persons (of which 10.25% to be covered by the jobholder and 
12.55% by the employer). For self-employed persons and farmers reduced contribution rates 
apply, currently amounting to 18.5% and 16.5% respectively. Insurance contributions only 
have to be paid for earned income up to an upper-earnings limit, currently amounting to a 
monthly gross earning of EUR 4,440.00 per month. 
Although the statutory pension system is at first instance financed from insurance 
contributions, tax-financed funds play some role as well. According to the so-called 
“deficiency guarantee”, the federal state has to finance pension spending from the general 
budget if respective outlays are higher than revenues from insurance contributions (which is 
always the case). Furthermore, there are rules in place stipulating that outlays for some 
specific elements of the statutory pension system are to be covered by the general budget. 
Here, the by far most important matter of expense is the so-called “equalisation supplement”, 
which serves as a kind of minimum pension (see below). 
In 2012, the overall share coming from the federal budget (so-called “Bundesbeitrag”) 
amounted to about EUR 8.323 billion, which equals approx. 2.7% of GDP or 23.3% of overall 




Calculation of benefits and minimum pensions 
The formula for the calculation of benefits underwent rather large-scale reforms in the early 
2000s (decided in 2001, 2003 and 2004; see e.g. Fink 2009 and Knell et al. 2006 for a more 
detailed assessment). These reforms are subject to a number of different transitional 
arrangements, but from a mid-term perspective, the effect will be a largely linear benefit 
formula (however subject to a lower and upper ceiling). With these reforms, the contribution 
base to be taken into account was expanded from the “best” 15 years to lifetime earnings. 
Apart from that, the accrual rate was reduced from 2% to 1.78% per year. The maximum 
replacement rate of 80% of the assessment base will be reached after an insurance history of 
                                                 
1
  Employees with wages below the so-called marginal earnings threshold (currently EUR 386.80 per month 
gross) may opt into the old-age insurance on a voluntary basis. 
2
  This means that pensions for newly employed federal civil servants are calculated according to the same 
regulations as those of other persons (for those being younger than 50 in the year 2005, pension entitlements 
are calculated as a mix of old and new provisions on a pro rata temporise basis, while those older than 50 
were exempted from the new system). Furthermore, it should be noted that the federal provinces 
(Bundesländer) run their own systems for their civil servants. However, most federal provinces enacted 
related reforms during recent years as well, aligning respective regulations towards the rules in place in the 
normal “statutory pension system”. Exceptions are the federal provinces of Vienna and Tyrol, where aims for 
a harmonisation of the schemes for public servants have been very limited, which was e.g. criticised by the 
Austrian Court of Auditors in his 2011 report on progress made within “administrative reform” 
(Rechnungshof 2011, 139ff.). 
3
  Source: Hauptverband der Österreichischen Sozialversicherungsträger (2013a, 119) and own calculations. 
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45 years, instead of 40 years before the reform. This means that benefits are, as a basic 
principle, granted as a percentage of the earlier contributory income from work (calculated as 
an average contributory income – the so-called contribution base). The benefit is the higher, 
the longer the insurance record, and the higher the preceding contributory income from 
gainful employment. 
However, these regulations (so-called “new law”) are only fully applied to those who had 
acquired less than 36 insurance months within old-age insurance before 1 January 2005. For 
other groups, benefits are calculated as a mix of old (so-called “old law”) and new provisions 
on a pro-rata temporise basis (so-called “parallel calculation”), whereby different regulations 
apply for different age groups. Furthermore, a rather complicated rule applies for “capping” 
the losses that derive from the above mentioned reforms, which makes things even more 
complicated (see Fink 2010 for a more detailed assessment). In 2011 it got decided that the 
rather complex model “parallel calculation” of pension benefits according to “old” and “new” 
law will get abolished as from 1 January 2014. Instead, all existing insurance periods are 
planned to be transferred to a so-called “pension account credit” (Kontogutschrift) according 
to “new law”. This will not lead to major changes in benefit levels (see below Chapter 2.1.3), 
but followed the aim to increase the transparency of the system. However, the transfer from 
“parallel accounting” towards the “pension account credit” itself is again a rather complicated 
and for most people likely to be a rather inscrutable procedure. 
It is worth noting that the reforms of the early 2000s did not only include measures leading to 
a retrenchment of benefits, but also some elements intended to soften the possible negative 
consequences of the pension reforms, especially for women, in the first instance deriving from 
the extension of the assessment base from the “best” 15 years to lifetime earnings, and to 
compensate for the disadvantages of women on the labour market to a certain extent. The 
minimum number of contribution years due to gainful work required for an old-age pension 
was reduced to seven years (formerly 15 years), and times spent for bringing up children, 
which are credited as pensionable years, were raised from two years to four years per child. 
Furthermore, the assessment base for times spent with bringing up children was raised from 
EUR 650 per month to EUR 1,350 per month (2011: EUR 1,560.98; 2012: EUR 1,570.35; 
2013: 1,614.32). 
The Austrian statutory pension system does not provide for an unconditional minimum 
pension for persons beyond a certain age. However, the so-called “means-tested equalisation 
supplement” (“Ausgleichszulage”) may - on a partly means-tested basis - apply for persons 
who are, in principle, eligible to a pension entitlement. This means that pensions of low 
benefit level may be raised to the so-called “equalisation supplement reference rate” in case of 
financial indigence. Thereby, apart from the pensioner’s income, the income of spouses or 
partners is taken into account (but not assets). The overall net yearly equalisation supplement 
reference rate (taking into account insurance contributions for health insurance) currently 
amounts to EUR 11,129 for singles and to EUR 16,686 for couples. Furthermore, a 
supplement of currently EUR 129.24 per month is granted per child. 
Maximum levels of pensions are indirectly stipulated via the upper earnings limit for 
insurance contributions (see above), where income above this limit is not subject to insurance 
contributions, but which is at the same time also not taken into account as contributory 
income for calculating pensions. In 2012, the maximum pension from the statutory pension 
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system amounted to EUR 3,034.16 per month (gross; 14 times per year
4
), which equals a 
yearly net pension of EUR 30,791.38.
5
 
Indexation and taxation 
Pension benefits in Austria are – in principle – indexed according to the so-called pensioners’ 
price index, applying a specific market basket, but decisions are frequently taken within 
legislature to index pensions according to a model which is only indirectly linked to the 
pensioners’ price index, leading to different levels of indexation for different benefit levels. 
Pensions in Austria are subject to income tax, with the same tax brackets applying as for 
income from gainful employment. Furthermore, pensioners have to pay social insurance 
contributions for health insurance, amounting to 5.1% of their pension benefits. 
Retirement age and early exit pathways 
The statutory retirement age is 65 for men and 60 for women, with the latter planned to be 
gradually raised as from 2024, also reaching 65 years in 2033.  
Austria shows a rather long and vivid history of different schemes of early retirement. Early 
retirement due to “reduced capacity to work” and “on account of unemployment” was 
abolished under the reforms of 2000 and 2003. However, other forms of early retirement are 
still in place, both according to “old law” and according to “new law”. 
One form of early retirement according to “old law” is “early retirement on account of long-
term insurance contributions” (“vorzeitige Alterspension bei langer Versicherungsdauer”). 
Here, decided as part of the reform 2003, the minimum retirement age is subject to stepwise 
increase until 2017, up to the statutory retirement age. In July 2012 the minimum age for this 
form of early retirement is 63 years and 8 months for men, 58 years and 8 months for women. 
With the reform of 2003, deductions for each year of early retirement have been increased 
from 3.3% of the benefit to 4.2%. However, this increase of deductions is subject to a 
“capping” of losses, which in specific cases may lead to somewhat lower actual deductions 
(see Fink 2010 for more details). For a long time, this scheme used to be the most popular 
form of early retirement in Austria. In December 2000, no less than 132,167 individuals 
obtained a benefit according to this scheme, but due to the following reforms, the respective 
number decreased to 18,331 in December 2010, to 14,811 in December 2011 and then further 
to 10,720 in December 2012 and to 7,717 in December 2013.
6
 
One other form of early retirement (again according to “old law”) is “pensions subject to very 
long insurance periods” (so-called “Langzeitversichertenregelung” or “Hacklerregelung”). 
Within this scheme, men used to have the opportunity to retire without deductions (!) as from 
the age of 60 and women as from the age of 55 if their insurance periods totalled 45 
contributory years (men) or 40 contributory years (women), respectively. This form of early 
retirement has gained increased popularity over the last years, with the number of individuals 
receiving such a pension rising from 11,494 in December 2006 to 83,988 in December 2010 
and then further to 89,147 in December 2011. Then, the respective number declined to some 
minor degree, to 88,763 in December 2012 but afterwards it increased again to 90,522 in 
December 2013.
7
 This scheme was originally planned to expire in 2010, but was then - within 
the scope of the Sozialrechtsänderungsgesetz 2008; BGBl. Nr. I XX/2008 - decided to be 
prolonged by three years, i.e. until 2013. However, debates on the subject continued and, in 
October 2010, a new reform of the Hacklerregelung was presented, which at the same time 
                                                 
4
  Pensions (same as salaries and wages) are paid out 14 times per year in Austria. 
5
  But it should be stressed that retired public servants subject to “old law” may be granted much higher 
pensions. 
6
  Data source: Hauptverband der Österreichischen Sozialversicherungsträger. 
7
  Data source: Hauptverband der Österreichischen Sozialversicherungsträger. 
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prolonged the instrument for some more years. Hereby, the first measure implemented (from 
2011) was that prices for post-purchasing of contributory times - for periods of school and 
university studies - were raised considerably. The other measures of the respective reform will 
only get applicable as from 2014: 
- The entry age will be raised by two years as from 2014, i.e. from 60 to 62 for men and 
from 55 to 57 for women. Furthermore, the entry age for women born after 1 January 
1959 will be increased stepwise to 62 years as from 2014 (the entry age of 62 years for 
women will be in place as from the year of 2027) and women born after 1 January 1959 
will, as men currently, have to have an insurance record of at least 540 months of 
contribution (previously: 480 months of contribution). 
- As from 2014, the number of constellations which may count as “substitutional insurance 
times” (Ersatzzeiten) are substantially reduced. Only times spent within military service 
and/or alternative service [in lieu of military service] (up to 30 months) and times for 
raising children (up to five years) are credited as Ersatzzeiten. Previous options were: 
post-purchasing of contributory times for periods of school and university studies, times 
where people obtained sick pay (Krankengeld), times of voluntary insurance, times of 
“prolonged insurance” (Weiterversicherung) of recipients and unemployment benefit and 
unemployment assistance and times of obtaining unemployment benefit and 
unemployment assistance (which currently counts as Ersatzzeit for women born after the 1 
January 2005). 
- Furthermore, pensions according to the Hacklerregelung are subject to yearly deductions 
of 4.2% per year of early retirement since 2014. 
Although the overall aim of the pension reforms of the early 2000s was cost containment, the 
“new law” (as formulated by the pension reform 2004) has actually introduced new forms of 
early retirement. 
One is the so-called “heavy labour pension” (Schwerarbeiterpension), which effectively came 
into force on 1 January 2007. It allows for retirement at the age of 60 for men and women
8
, 
subject to a deduction of 4.2% for each year of retirement prior to the regular pension age for 
benefits calculated according to “old law” (with a maximum ceiling of 15%), and of 1.8% per 
year for benefits calculated according to “new law”.9 The general prerequisite is that 
insurance periods total 45 years and that out of the last 20 years before retirement at least 10 
years were spent working in jobs defined as heavy labour, the definition of which is 
determined according to detailed criteria. This form of early pension is only of minor 
significance up to now, but the number of people receiving such a pension is steadily 
growing. In December 2010, a total of 2,395 obtained an early retirement according to this 
scheme, 3,227 in December 2011, 3,732 in December 2012 and 4,482 in December 2013.
10
 
The second option under the “new law” is the possibility of early retirement through the 
establishment of a pension corridor (at the age between 62 and 68 years), with deducts/credits 
4.2% of the respective benefit per annum. Here, the entitlement originally has been restricted 
to persons with at least 37.5 years of pensionable service. In 2012 it got decided to increase 
this threshold to 40 years. This pension corridor is intended to substitute the “early retirement 
on account of long-term insurance contributions” (which will be completely abolished by 
                                                 
8
  However, this form of pension is de facto only used by men, as the general statutory retirement age for 
women is 60 years anyhow. 
9
  For individuals who acquired at least 36 insurance months within old age insurance before 1 January 2005 
benefits are calculated as a mix of “old” and “new” provisions on a pro rata temporis basis, whereby different 
regulations apply for different age groups. 
10
  Data source: Hauptverband der Österreichischen Sozialversicherungsträger. 
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2017; see above). However, this form of early retirement may, in fact, be used together with 
early retirement according to “old law”, i.e. “early retirement on account of long-term 
insurance contributions”. In this case, special deductions apply, which are calculated 
according to very complicated regulations, with different deductions for benefits calculated 
according to “old law” and “new law”. Currently this form of early retirement may evidently 
be of interest to men only, as the actual statutory retirement age for women of 60 years lies 
below that threshold. In December 2010, a total of 10,378 persons obtained a corridor 




Apart from these options of early retirement in old-age pension, it is worth mentioning that 
invalidity pensions for a long time increasingly tended to serve as a substitute for other forms 
of early exit from the labour market (see subsequent chapters of this report for more details). 
This subject has been on the political agenda in Austria for several years, and as from 2010 
several decisions were taken to modify access to invalidity pensions (see below Chapter 
2.1.3).  
2.1.3 Details on recent reforms 
First, recent reforms dealt, as already sketched out above (Chapter 2.1.2), with a modification 
of access to early retirement via “pensions subject to very long insurance periods” (so-called 
“Langzeitversichertenregelung” or “Hacklerregelung”). Decided already in 2010, the 
measures expected to have the highest impact on tightening access to this form of early 
retirement is only implemented as from 2014. 
A second area of increased reform activity was the one of invalidity pensions. A first reform, 
as well decided in 2010, got implemented as from 2011. The most important measures were 
the introduction of mandatory rehabilitation measures before granting an invalidity pension, 
and changes in regulations on so-called “vocational protection” (Berufsschutz), whereby 
access to invalidity pensions was somewhat tightened for white-collar employees and skilled 
workers. But at the same time access to invalidity pension was somewhat eased for unskilled 
workers within a special new scheme called “hardship provision” (Härtefallregelung), which 
is, however, planned to expire again in 2015 (see Fink 2011 for more details). This reform did 
not lead to an overall reduction of the number of invalidity pensions in 2011, but the increase 
of the number of people obtaining such a pension could be somewhat reined when compared 
to earlier years. In December 2010 a sum of 209,431 persons received an invalidity pension, 
211,144 persons in December 2011, 208,339 in December 2012 and in December 2013 the 
respective number was 204,096.
12
 
In February 2012, as part of a “budget consolidation package”, the government again 
announced a reform of invalidity pensions, leading to further tightening of access to 
respective benefits. Some measures decided got implemented as from January 2013; others 
will only get implemented as from January 2014. The most important steps decided are: 
 Invalidity pensions may only be granted in case of enduring inability to work, and not in 
case of temporary inability to work. Instead, the PES (Public Employment Service; 
Arbeitsmarktservice) will have to deal with this group, which will then have access to a 
so-called “rehabilitation benefit” and a “retraining benefit” instead of invalidity pension. 
This reform will not directly lead to a reduction of public spending, given the additional 
costs for rehabilitation measures and the fact that the retraining  benefit will be of the 
same average level as the invalidity pension. However, indirect cuts in public spending are 
                                                 
11
  Data source: Hauptverband der Österreichischen Sozialversicherungsträger. 
12
  Data source: Hauptverband der Österreichischen Sozialversicherungsträger. 
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envisaged due to longer economic activity and later retirement, which are the main goals 
of this measure. The replacement of invalidity pensions by rehabilitation benefit and 
retraining benefit applies for all persons who have not reached their 50
th
 birthday on 
1.1.2014. This means that only the cohort then already in the age of 50 years or older is 
exempted from this reform. 
 According to a specific clause in the rules on “vocational protection” (Berufsschutz) 
people having reached a specific age may be granted access to invalidity pension if they 
become unable to perform the occupation that they were engaged in for at least ten years 
during the last 15 years. Here, only “reasonable occupational changes” have to be 
accepted by individuals and in 2010, about 43% of all new cases of invalidity pensions in 
the age above 55 years applied due to this regulation. Now, it has been decided to increase 
the minimum age level of access to invalidity pension according to this clause stepwise: 
from 57 years in 2012 to 58 years as from 2013, to 59 years in 2015 and then further to 60 
years as from 2017. It is envisaged that this will lead to a reduction in public spending of 
an amount of EUR 464 million between 2012 and 2016. 
 Up to recently, people applying for an invalidity pension were granted a “pension 
advance” (Pensionsvorschuss) while their application was examined by the responsible 
authorities. As from 1 January 2013, such a pension advance may only be granted after the 
completion of the relevant medical examinations and a respective decision stating 
incapacity to work. Instead of the pension advance, respective persons may in future have 
access to unemployment benefit, unemployment assistance or to benefits from GMI 
(Guaranteed Minimum Income, which replaced Social Assistance as from 2010/2011). As 
respective benefits are lower than the pension advance in most cases, it is estimated that 
this reform will lead to reduction of public spending amounting to EUR 309 million until 
2016.  
Other recent reforms, as well decided as part of the “budget consolidation package” presented 
in 2012 are (see as well Fink 2012): 
 Beyond standard indexation of pension benefits in 2013 and 2014 (envisaged spending 
cuts: EUR 2.56 billion until 2016). 
 Tightening access to early retirement is the so-called pensions corridor (see above): in 
future 480 instead of 450 months of pensionable service will be needed to enter early 
retirement via this scheme (envisaged spending cuts: EUR 509 million until 2016). 
 The complicated model of “parallel calculation” of pension benefits according to “old” 
and “new” law (introduced with the pension reforms of the early 2000s; see above and 
Fink 2009) got decided to be abolished as from 1 January 2014. Instead, all existing 
insurance periods are planned to be transferred to a so-called “pension account credit” 
(Kontogutschrift) according to “new law”. This goes ahead with an extension of the 
assessment base and a lower accrual rate (when compared to the impact of insurance times 
according to “old law” within the modus of parallel calculation), which could lead to a 
substantial reduction of future benefits. However, it was decided to mitigate this effect via 
higher valorisation of “old” insurance records and losses deriving from the change from 
“parallel calculation” towards the “pension account credit” are capped at a maximum 
3.5% (for the reference date of 1 January 2014; for older people even more strict capping 
is planned). Cost containment effects of this measure are likely to be more substantial 
“only” in the medium and long-term. Envisaged spending cuts deriving from this measure 
only amount to a sum of EUR 123 million until 2016. 
 Until the end of 2012, older workers (from the age of 60) were exempted from paying 
social insurance contributions to unemployment insurance. In spring 2012 the government 
decided to abolish respective exemptions from paying insurance contributions as from 1 
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January 2013 for all new cases. It was expected that this will lead to additional revenues 
amounting to a sum of EUR 303 million until 2016. In a related way, the earlier existing 
exemption from paying unemployment insurance contributions already from the age of 58 
got suspended in summer 2011.  
 It as well was decided to increase the social insurance contributions of self-employed and 
of farmers within old-age pension, resulting in additional public revenues amounting to 
EUR 554 million until 2016. 
 Furthermore, the upper earnings limit up to which social insurance contributions have to 
be paid for income from gainful employment – apart from regular indexation – got raised 
by an additional amount of EUR 90 in 2013. It was estimated that this would imply to 
additional revenues of EUR 218 million in the pension system until 2016, and additional 
EUR 53 million within the unemployment insurance. 
 The third pillar of the Austrian pension system was as well been affected by the 
consolidation package. Within the “premium-aided pension savings scheme” 
(Prämienbegünstigte Zukunftsvorsorge) public subsidies have been cut by about 50% as 
from April 2012. This measure is of temporary nature, meaning that public subsidies will 
eventually be increased again after 2016. Savings in public spending were estimated to 
amount to a sum of ca. EUR 172 million until the end of 2016. 
 Within the consolidation package, it got as well decided to introduce a model of ex-ante 
taxing of funded company pension schemes (“Pensionskassen”). Hereby, insured persons, 
people who already receive a respective benefit, or who will have access to such benefits 
in the next five years, were offered the option for a reduced ex-ante taxing of their 
accumulated funds in 2012. Hereby, the tax rate only amounted to 50% of the normal 
income tax rate applying under other conditions. This increased further net benefits within 
the respective schemes (due to overall lower taxation), and at the same time it was 
expected that in 2012 additional revenues for the public budget would amount to approx. 
EUR 900 million. However, this model also implied that future revenues for the state from 
income tax will be lower than under normal taxation, which e.g. has been criticised by the 
Green party in opposition, stating that “future tax revenues are … sold at a dumping 
price”.13 In the end, much less persons than originally envisaged used this option, so that 




In the year 2013 literally no new measures got announced regarding the pension system. It 
appears that the governing parties were not willing to come up with further reforms (most 
likely enclosing further retrenchment) during the months preceding the national elections held 
in September 2013. Within the coalition negotiations, held between the Social Democrats 
(SPÖ) and the People’s Party (ÖVP) in autumn 2013, it got evident that the public budget 
deficit will be much higher in the next years than originally expected, if no further reforms get 
decided. Still, the new government programme, presented in December 2013, did not come up 
with a new consolidation package, eventually as well addressing the pension system. 
Regarding the latter it at first instance comprises new concrete steps on the aim to increase the 
actual retirement age, which is envisaged to rise from 58.4 years in 2012 to 60.1 years in 
2018. Furthermore, the employment rat of men in the age 55-59 is planned to increase from 
68.1% un 2012 to 74.6% in 2018, for men in the age 60-64 from 21.6% to 35.3% and for 
women in the age 55-59 from 47.9% to 62.9%. The goal on the increase of the actual 
retirement age appears to be rather ambitious, given the fact that respective numbers only 
                                                 
13
  OTS0163 II, WI 29.02.2012; APA0560 WI, II 29.02.2012. 
14
  See http://diepresse.com/home/wirtschaft/economist/1312756/Zusatzpensionen_645-Millionen-weniger-im-
Budget?from=suche.intern.portal (retrieved 25.11.2013). 
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increasedto a marginal degree in Austria over the last years (see below chapter 2.2.2). At the 
same time the government programme only announces some rather minor and not very far-
reaching additional measures to accomplish these goals.
15
 What appears to prevail on this 
background is the confidence that the full implementation of measures already decided in the 
past will be largely sufficient to reach the defined numerical goals.  
2.2 Assessment of strengths and weaknesses 
2.2.1 Adequacy 
The coverage of the pension system is in principle comparatively high in Austria, as it covers 
nearly all persons in gainful employment, of which the most important are: employees, the 
self-employed, farmers, apprentices, and – partly covered via specific schemes – civil 
servants. For most of these groups a minimum income threshold (Geringfügigkeitsgrenze) 
applies for access of social insurance, but one can as well opt-in to the system even when 
earned income does not reach the respective threshold or one can decide for voluntary 
continued insurance in case of economic inactivity. Furthermore, times for bringing up 
children are counted as insurance period for a maximum of the first 48 months of lifetime per 
child (for women born after 1.1.1955
16
) and times when receiving benefits from 
unemployment insurance as well count as insured periods in pension insurance. Still, given 
the traditionally strong role of the so-called “male-breadwinner” family arrangement, a rather 
high share of women in the past did not manage to fulfil the preconditions for own benefit 
entitlements. According to calculations by Gstrein (2009) about 15% of all women in the age 
60 and above did not have access to an own or derived old-age benefit in 2003. However, the 
respective situation is likely to have improved somewhat in the meanwhile due to generally 
increased work intensity of women over the last decades. 
Another traditional problem of the Austrian statutory pension system is the one of rather high 
differentiation of benefits. This phenomenon derives from the “principle of equivalence”17, 
which even got strengthened with the reforms of the early 2000s and which re-produces 
income inequality within gainful employment within the pension system. Respective 
imbalances especially get evident when comparing benefits granted to women to the ones 
granted to men. The problem of rather low pension benefits granted to women does not only 
apply for the average of existing pensions, but for newly granted pensions as well, where one 
would expect higher equality of benefits due to rising labour market participation of women. 
In both cases, direct old-age pensions of women only reach a level of about 55% to 60% of 
respective benefits of men, depending on whether equalisation supplements are taken into 
account or not (see Fink 2012).
18
 The gap is only somewhat smaller regarding newly granted 
pensions if invalidity pensions are taken into account as well, which lead to lower outcomes 
especially in the case of men (see ibid. and last footnote). 
                                                 
15
  E.g. concerning a possible reform of the so-called “termination levy” (Auflösugsabgabe), which employers 
under specific circumstances have to pay if they terminate the work contract of an older job-holder, by 
introducing a new part-time pension or by increasing the bonus in the system of the old-age pension for job-
holders who work beyond statutory retirement age (see Regierungsprogramm 2013, 64). 
16
  For women born before that date a somewhat different model applies, see: 
https://www.help.gv.at/Portal.Node/hlpd/public/content/27/Seite.270215.html (retrieved 25.11.2013) 
17
  Meaning the notion that the level of benefits should at first instance reflect the level and duration of earlier 
insurance contributions. 
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Still, regarding core indicators for social inclusion, as agreed upon at EU-level, the Austrian 
pension system performs rather well at first sight from an international comparative 
perspective (see Table 1 below). 
 




 Total Men Women Total Men Women 
Median relative income of 
people aged 65+ as a ratio of 
income of people aged 0-64 93 99 91 91 95 89 
Aggregate replacement ratio 58 63 57 54 57 52 
At-risk-of-poverty rate:    
  age 65- 14.2 13.8 14.7 17.5 17.1 17.8 
  age 65+ / 75+ 15.1 / 16.6 11.5 / 12.5 17.8 / 19.2 14.4 / 15.7 12.0 / 12.5 16.3 / 17.9 
Severe material deprivation:    
  age 65- 4.5 4.2 4.7 10.4 10.3 10.5 
  age 65+ / 75+ 1.9 / 1.9 1.4 / 2.1 2.2 / 1.8 7.5 / 7.7 6.1 / 5.9 8.6 / 9.0 
At risk of poverty or social 
exclusion (EU2020 indicator):        
  age 65- 18.9 18.2 19.7 25.9 25.2 26.7 
  65+ / 75+ 16.2 / 17.8 12.6 / 14.1 18.9 / 20.2 19.2 / 20.7 16.2 / 16.7 21.5 / 23.4 
Income distribution (S80/S20): 
age 65- / 65+ 4.2 / 4.1 4.3 / 4.0 4.2 / 4.1 5.3 / 4.0 5.4 / 4.1 5.3 / 3.9 
Source: EUSILC; Eurostat Database. 
When compared to the average of EU-27, in Austria a considerably lower share of people at 
the age of 65+ is at risk of poverty or faces social exclusion (EU-2020 indicator; Austria: 
total: 16.2%, men: 12.6%, women: 18.9%; EU-27: total: 19.2%, men 16.2%: women: 21.5%). 
The latter is at first instance caused by below average rates of severe material deprivation at 
the age of 65+ (for both sexes) (Austria: total: 1.9%; men: 1.4%; women: 2.2%; EU-27: total: 
7.5%; men 6.1%: women: 8.6%). The at-risk-of poverty rate of Austrian elderly men aged 
65+ (11.5%) and 75+ (12.5%) is at about the average of EU-27 (65+: 12.0%, 75+: 12.5%), 
whereas the at-risk-of-poverty rates of elderly Austrian women (both for the age-groups 65+: 
17.8% and 75+: 19.2%) are somewhat higher than at average of EU-27 (65+: 16.3%; 75+: 
17.9%). 
When compared to the at-risk-of-poverty rate of the population at the age below 65 (total: 
14.2%, men: 13.8%, women: 14.7%), at-risk-of poverty rates of elderly women (aged 65+ and 
especially aged 75+) are considerably higher, whereas the reverse situation – however in a 
less pronounced form – applies for men When compared to the average of EU-27, the degree 
to what the at-risk-of poverty rate of women in the age 65+ exceeds the one of younger 
women is comparatively high. Severe material deprivation in Austria is a much less common 
phenomenon in the age groups 65+ (total: 1.9%) and 75+ (total: 1.9%), than it is regarding the 
ones in the age group below 65 (total: 4.5%). Data on averages of EU-27 point to the same 
direction, however with a lower degree of relative differentiation (below 65, total: 10.4%; 
65+, total: 7.5%). 
In Austria, income inequality (S80/S20) is considerably below average of EU-27 for people at 
age below 65 years, but higher than average of EU-27 regarding elderly people aged 65 and 
over. 
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Overall, it appears that the Austrian pension system shows a high degree of adequacy in terms 
of severe material deprivation. However, when a more relative indicator like being at-risk-of 
poverty is used, the performance of the Austrian pension system (in terms of social inclusion) 
is less favourable. The latter especially holds for women, whereby inequalities within the 
labour market (in terms of earned income and continuity of employment/insurance 
contributions) get reproduced within the pension system. 
Regarding indicators measuring the income replacement role of pensions, the median relative 
income ratio for people 65+, as a ratio of income of the age group 0-64, at 93% is higher than the 
EU-27 average (91%) and so is the aggregate replacement ratio (median individual pensions of 
65-74 year olds relative to median individual earnings of 50-59 years old) (Austria: 58%; EU-27 
average of 54% in 2012). 
The gender break-up of all these indicators shows that old-age women currently present 
higher risk of poverty or social exclusion and severe material deprivation and in general enjoy 
lower standards of living than old-aged men in Austria. This is mainly a result of women who 
receive only a survivor's pensions and have no pension entitlement of their own, but also of 
high gender pay gap and gender difference in the retirement age. 
Future adequacy 
Regarding future developments, the net theoretical replacement rate (NRR) for a hypothetical 
male worker with average income from employment retiring at 65 after 40-years career is 
projected to grow from 85% in 2008 to 88.7% in 2050.
19
 The negative effect of 3 years of 
unemployment which came to 0.6 p.p. of the NRR in 2010 will be three times larger in 2050 
(1.9 p.p. smaller NRR with respect to the base case). In the same period the negative effect of 
a 3 year childcare break would be reduced from 2 p.p. to just 0.8 p.p. (with respect to the base 
case). The effect of a 10 year career break on the NRR would increase from a loss of about 
14.9 p.p. to a loss of 18 p.p. (with respect to the full career base-case).   
NRR for high earners would drop from 77.2% to 72.1%, whereas the NRR for low earners 
would be slightly increased from 83.7% to 83.8%. This means that the NRR for a low income 
worker will remain to be lower than for an average income worker, which stands out in 
international comparative perspective and which is questioning the adequacy of the pension 
system for that group. Furthermore, negative effects of unemployment and of career breaks 
(other than ones due to childcare) will increase in the future (when compared to the full career 
base-case). Against this background, challenges for pension adequacy will remain to occur 
especially in cases of a combination of low earned income and interrupted working careers. 
Hereby, it should be stressed that the median relative income of people 65+ (as a ratio of 
income of people 0-64) as well as public spending for old-age pensions are very high in 
Austria from an international comparative point of view. However, problems appear regarding 
the distributional impact of the system, as evident in the data on being at-risk-of-poverty 
(especially in the case of women). The reforms of the early 2000s did not deal with these 
problems in a proactive way. The reduction of accrual rates according to a uniform model 
(irrespective of income levels) and the expansion of the assessment period are likely to lead to 
a higher incidence of low-level benefits within the system of old-age pensions in the future. 
The latter is even more likely on the background of the on-going further differentiation of the 
Austrian labour market, as evident e.g. from a rising share of part-time employment (which is 
to an extremely high degree concentrated on women) and a growing low-wage sector (for 
more details on the latter point see e.g. Geisberger/Knittler 2010; Geisberger 2013). 
                                                 
19
  Source for data NRR projections: European Commission (2012).  





According to the most recent projections by the Austrian “Commission on Long-Term 
Sustainability of the Pension System” (Kommission zur langfristigen Pensionssicherung 
2013a), presented in October 2013, the old-age dependency ratio (the population aged 65 and 
over as a percentage of the population aged 15-64) will rise from 26.8% in 2012 to 48.6% in 
2050 and to 50.5% in 2060 (ibid. 85). 
Employment 
The labour market participation rate (age 15-64) is projected to rise from 72.4% in 2012 to 
73.5% in 2020, and then further to 77.1% in 2050 and to 77.3% in 2060. Labour market 
participation rates in the age 55 to 64 are projected to rise from 40.2% (2012) to 60.1% 
(2060). For women a higher respective increase (from 30.7% to 56.9%) is expected than for 
men (from 50.3% to 63.4%) (ibid., 20).  
The average exit age from the labour market is predicted to rise from currently 57.8 years for 
men to about 58.5 years in 2020 and then further to approx. 60.4 years in 2030. After that, it is 
expected to rise further to about 61 years and then remain at about that level. 
For women the respective numbers are about 55.2 years in 2012, ca. 56.5 years in 2020, 59 
years in 2030 and will then reach a level of close to 60 years.  
When taking in mind that the statutory pension age for men currently is 65 years, and that it 
for women, according to current plans, will stepwise be increased from 60 years to 65 years 
between 2024 and 2033, these projections appear to be rather conservative. In other words: 
the experts in the Commission expect the actual retirement age only to increase in the very 
long run
20
, and only to a level substantially below statutory pension age. This at the same time 
would mean that different forms of early retirement and invalidity pensions remain to play a 
significant role. 
Data in Table 2 shows the distribution of pensions newly granted since 2005. Strikingly, more 
than two thirds of all new pensioners exit the labour market via an early retirement scheme or 
via an invalidity pension. The situation improved somewhat recently (i.e. in 2012), but it 
evidently is still worrying.  
The overall actual retirement age for all newly granted direct pensions (i.e. excluding 
dependent's pensions) increased only to a marginal degree in Austria over the last years (see 
Chart 1). 
  
                                                 
20
  This expectation is contradictive to the targets presented in December 2013 in the new government 
programme (see above chapter 2.1.3). 




Table 2: Direct pensions newly granted; 2005-2012 
 







Early retirement due 






Early retirement  
due to 
 "heavy labour 
pension" 
Invalidity pension Total 
  
N % N % N % N % N % N % N % 
2005 21,663 26.5 29,172 35.7 0 0.0 0 0.0 67 0.1 30,860 37.7 81,762 100.0 
2006 21,330 26.1 17,708 21.7 1,124 1.4 11,639 14.2 13 0.0 29,975 36.6 81,789 100.0 
2007 24,617 28.1 13,373 15.3 1,610 1.8 17,050 19.5 448 0.5 30,440 34.8 87,538 100.0 
2008 25,549 28.8 10,070 11.3 2,601 2.9 19,552 22.0 863 1.0 30,119 33.9 88,754 100.0 
2009 26,803 28.0 8,327 8.7 3,763 3.9 26,217 27.4 596 0.6 30,131 31.4 95,837 100.0 
2010 25,351 27.7 7,117 7.8 4,643 5.1 25,086 27.4 676 0.7 28,649 31.3 91,522 100.0 
2011 26,903 28.9 7,472 8.0 5,337 5.7 23,963 25.8 1,100 1.2 28,278 30.4 93,053 100.0 
2012 27,614 30.4 6,684 7.4 5,602 6.2 22,676 25.0 1,132 1.2 27,023 29.8 90,731 100.0 
Source: Hauptverband der Österreichischen Sozialversicherungsträger; Büro der Kommission zur langfristigen 
Pensionssicherung (2013). 
 
Chart 1: Actual retirement age: newly granted direct pensions according to pension type 
and sex; 2005-2012 
 




According to the most recent projections by the Austrian “Commission on Long-Term 
Sustainability of the Pension System” (Kommission 2013), presented in October 2013, the 
expenditure for pensions within statutory old-age insurance will rise from 10.1% of GDP in 
2012 to a maximum of 13.2% between 2047 and 2051 and will then shrink to 12.7% in 2060. 
If expenditures for rehabilitation measures and administrational costs are taken into account 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Men: all direct pensions 57,2 57,6 57,9 58,1 58,2 58,3 58,5 58,6
Men: invalidity pensions 53 53,1 53,2 53 52,9 52,8 52,9 53
Men: old-age pensions 61,9 62 62 62,1 62,1 62,1 62,3 62,5
Women: all direct pensions 55,9 56,2 56,2 56,3 56,4 56,4 56,6 56,6
Women: invalidity pensions 50,4 50,1 50 49,8 49,7 49,4 49,4 49,4
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as well, the respective numbers are 11.2% of GDP in 2012, a maximum of 14.6% between 
2047 and 2052, which will then decrease to 14.2% as from 2059 (ibid., table 25 & 26). 
However, these data on pension expenditure are somewhat misleading, as they do not take 
into account costs of pensions of former civil servants, to be covered by the general budget. 
Hereby, it has to be taken into account that employees of the Federal Republic and the federal 
provinces will in the future to an increasing degree be covered by the statutory old-age 
insurance and not by the earlier special pension scheme for this group (so-called 
Ruhegenüsse). This means that the increased spending for the statutory old-age insurance has 
to be put into relation to developments of costs according to the traditional special pension 
scheme(s) for civil servants. Respective analyses show that increases in the overall spending 
for pensions (as well taking into account reductions of spending within the systems of civil 
servants) are considerably lower than according to the estimations by the “Commission on 
Long-Term Sustainability of the Pension System”. According to the data presented by the 
“Commission on Long-Term Sustainability of the Pension System” spending for pensions 
within the statutory pension system will rise by 2.7 percentage points of GDP until 2040, and 
by 3.1 percentage points of GDP until 2050. However, spending for pensions of civil servants, 
according to calculations by the Austrian Chamber of Labour (based on the EG Ageing 
Report 2012), will at the same time decrease by 1 percentage point of GDP until 2040 and by 
1.8 percentage points until 2050.
21
 This means that the effects on additional costs for the 
public budget, as projected by the “Commission”, are probably too pessimistic.22 
2.2.3 Private pensions 
Private schemes have a rather limited role in overall provisions, although coverage and the 
accumulated funds have increased somewhat in recent years. In the second quarter 2013 ca. 
751,000 persons (or ca. 20% of the dependent employees) were entitled to receive an 
additional pension from an occupational scheme in the future, and about 77,000 persons 
(which equals 5.1% of the population aged 65 and above) were already beneficiaries.
23
 
The second pillar was somewhat strengthened by the introduction of the new severance pay 
scheme in 2003. Employers are obliged to pay 1.53% of the monthly gross salary to a staff 
provision fund set up especially for this purpose. Employees have the option to withdraw their 
savings in case of termination of a work contract (if specific preconditions are fulfilled) or to 
keep them until retirement age. The latter option, however, does not seem to be widely used at 
the moment. 
Regarding the third pillar – i.e. private savings – since 2003 public subsidies are available 
within a scheme called “premium-aided pension savings scheme” (Prämienbegünstigte 
Zukunftsvorsorge). The impact of the “premium-aided pension savings scheme” on the level 
of future pensions is likely to be rather limited. About  1,614,000 of such contracts on savings 
plans existed at the end of 2011, covering only about a quarter of the population at the age 
below 60. Furthermore, the level of premiums paid to such schemes typically appears to be 
rather low. In 2011, the average premium amounted to about EUR 624 to 699 per year 
(depending on the type of provider of the scheme) (see FMA 2012). 
                                                 
21
  See http://blog.arbeit-wirtschaft.at/langfristige-entwicklungstrends-des-pensionssystems-crashszenarien-
schauen-anders-aus/ (retrieved 25.11.2013) 
22
  See as well: http://derstandard.at/1381370307591/Pensionsexperten-Kurzfristige-Entwarnung (retrieved 
25.11.2013). 
23
  Source: Data provided by FMA (2013); see: 
http://www.fma.gv.at/typo3conf/ext/dam_download/secure.php?u=0&file=10831&t=1385117116&hash=8bc
6874bca40b0f63ecda2e9b0344ce5 (retrieved 10.11.2013).  




The Austrian pension system performs very well on preventing severe material deprivation in 
old-age, whereas outcomes regarding at-risk of poverty rates are only somewhat more 
favourable than at average of EU-27 for men, and the at-risk-of-poverty rates of elderly 
Austrian women are even higher than at average of EU-27. At the same time the Austrian 
pension system is rather cost-intensive when compared to other Member States of the EU.
24
 
This, together with the high differences in benefit levels produced by the system points to the 
direction of a problematic, i.e. rather limited, intragenerational distributional impact of the 
system in place. 
One other problem, which as well contributes to spending, is the high incidence of early exits 
from the labour market via different schemes of early retirement and invalidity pensions. The 
latter topic has been on the political agenda for several years now, and decisions have been 
taken to increase efforts for health and vocational rehabilitation and to tighten access to 
invalidity pensions and early retirement. These measures show already some (however rather 
limited) positive effects, but their full impact will only get visible when more elements of the 
respective reforms get implemented as from 2014. 
As for all EU Member States, projections on future financial development indicate a 
considerable increase in public spending on pensions. However, for many Member States 
higher increases are expected than for the case of Austria, where reforms decided as from the 
1990s came with a considerable effect of cost containment. Still, the Austrian pension scheme 
according to these calculations will remain to be one of the most cost-intensive pension 
schemes of all EU Member States (see e.g. European Commission 2012, 111). According to 
respective projections cost containment will especially be reached by reducing NRRs for 
earlier high income earners, but at the same time NRRs of former low income earners will 
only increase by a very small degree (see above chapter 2.2.1). This means that adequacy 
problems of benefits, i.e. in the form of low benefit levels for some groups, will remain to be 
in place if no reforms are taken on this issue. 
One other point worth mentioning is the fact that the second and third pillar of the Austrian 
pension scheme is underdeveloped from an international point of view. However, it can be 
argued that this is not per se a problem, as long as the first (public and PAYG) pillar of the 
pension system guarantees adequate benefit levels. The latter could be reached in a revenue-
neutral way if the intragenerational redistributive impact of the system would be increased. 
Problems of financial sustainability of the pension system could be mitigated to a 
considerable degree if early retirement would be prevented in a consequent way. This would, 
most likely, lead to higher unemployment of persons at the age above 55. But at the same time 
deficits in “active ageing” would get more visible, potentially leading to increased efforts to 
improve the respective situation.     
  
2.3 Reform debates 
The question of a further reform of the Austrian pension system has permanently been on the 
political agenda to some degree, but the intensity of respective debates shows a rather high 
degree of volatility. 
In 2010, reforms on invalidity pensions and old-age pensions due to very long insurance 
records (so-called Hacklerregelung) was debated and decided. In early 2012 respective 
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  On aggregated public spending for pensions (incl. outlays for civil servants) see the Ageing Report 2012 of 
the EC (European Commission 2012). 
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debates again gained momentum, leading to the reforms sketched out above within the so-
called consolidation package. Then, regarding respective attempts by the main political 
decision makers, debates about the pension system abated to some degree. But recently, 
within the current coalition negotiations
25
 between the Social Democrats (SPÖ) and the 
Austrian Peoples Party (ÖVP) they reportedly played a significant role again. This increase of 
the intensity of debates on the topic of pensions was as well caused by the fact that a 
“cashing-up” conducted within the coalition negotiations reportedly came to the result that, 
when compared to earlier estimations, a sum of 8.7 billion EUR is missing within the pension 




Overall, it appears that pension issues during the last years only were debated more intensely 
by the most important decision makers in office when they were constrained to do so for 
reasons for short- to mid-term financial sustainability. In times where respective problems 
were not explicitly apparent, the strategy was to refer to reforms already decided. The 
message repeatedly was that reforms already had been taken and that their impact has to be 
awaited before reforms on further debates should take place. This only came to an end when 
new needs for the consolidation of public budgets got evident or could no longer be disguised.  
When in autumn 2012 a group of pension experts intended to start a broader debate on a 
structural reform of the Austrian pension system, proposing to change it towards a notional 
defined contribution (NDC) system
27
, most political actors
28
 refused to start a respective 
discussion, again arguing that decisions aiming at the long-term sustainability of pensions had 
already been taken and that the full impact of the reforms decided should be awaited.
29
 
Within the above mentioned coalition negotiations, debates on a further reform of the pension 
system were taking place “behind closed doors” between Social Democrats (SPÖ) and the 
Austrian Peoples’ Party (ÖVP). According to media reports the ÖVP within this negotiations 
proposed to bring forward the alignment of the statutory retirement age of women towards the 
one of men by some years. However, the SPÖ rejected such plans.
30
 One issue where 
agreement could be reached is the plan to retrench very high pensions deriving from special 
schemes (like the one of the Austrian National Bank, the Austrian Federal Railways, the 
Social Insurance Providers or for former politicians) to some degree via a constitutional bill.
31
 
Apart from that, the new government programme regarding pensions does not come with 
more structural or very substantial reform measures, but only announces that recent reforms 
should get implemented thoroughly, that monitoring will get improved, and that some 
selective measures will be taken to increase incentives for employment of elderly people
32
 
(both addressing employers and jobholders). 
                                                 
25
  Subsequent to the national elections held in September 2013. 
26
  See for example http://derstandard.at/1381371930239/Das-Nulldefizit-bleibt-das-Ziel (retrieved 15.11.2013) 
27
  See http://www.euro.centre.org/beitragskonten/index.php (retrieved 15.11.2013) 
28
  For one of the few exemptions, see: http://www.salzburg.com/nachrichten/oesterreich/politik/sn/artikel/iv-
unterstuetzt-pensions-experten-aufruf-29744/ (retrieved 15.11.2013) 
29




pensionsreform/3367441 (retrieved 25.11.2013) 
30
  http://diestandard.at/1385168548635/Frauen-und-Lehrer-entzweien-SPOe-und-OeVP (retrieved 25.11.2013) 
31
  See http://derstandard.at/1381372279261/Verfassungsgesetz-gegen-Pensionsprivilegien-geplant (retrieved 
25.11.2013) 
32
  Via a possible reform of the so-called “termination levy” (Auflösungsabgabe), which employers under 
specific circumstances have to pay if they terminate the work contract of an older job-holder, by introducing 
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Regarding pensions of the second and third pillar, it appears that scepticism about purely 
funded schemes became the norm in light of the unfavourable profit development of such 
schemes during the last years. Regarding important political actors, voices arguing for a 
further expansion of the existing schemes are largely absent. It is only the private insurance 
business and the pension funds that repeatedly ask for an expansion of respective public co-
financing and for increased incentives to invest in private pension products. The new 
government programme announces the plan to evaluate the second and third pillar of the 
pension system in a comprehensive way until the end of 2015, with reform measures 
eventually to be decided thereafter. 
The European Country Specific Recommendations for Austria, communicated by the Council 
within the European Semester of Europe 2020, repeatedly suggested the following (CSR No. 
2): 
“Bring forward the harmonisation of pensionable age for men and women, increasing the 
effective retirement age by aligning retirement age or pension benefits to changes in life 
expectancy implement and monitor the recent reforms restricting access to early retirement 
and further improve older workers’ employability in order to raise the effective retirement age 
and the employment rate of older workers.”33 
Most of these points have been on the agenda of the political debates mentioned above to 
some degree. The strongest reluctance appears to exist regarding the point of “aligning 
retirement age or pension benefits to changes in life expectancy”, and – up to recently – as 
well concerning “bringing forward the harmonisation of pensionable age for men and 
women”. The ÖVP reportedly pushed for such a reform within the coalition negotiations, but 
the SPÖ refused to agree (see above). 
Regarding the goal to rise the effective retirement age, only slight improvements were made 
in Austria over the last years. This was criticized by different stakeholders and political 
actors, and some of them even argued that the effective retirement age may only increase 
substantially if the statutory retirement age would be raised.
34
 However, the government until 
recently followed their usual strategy of arguing that the full implementation of reforms 
already decided, aiming at a higher actual retirement age, should be awaited, stressing that the 
first steps of these reforms already implemented show first positive effects.
35
 The new 
government programme, as mentioned above, announces plans for some punctual new 
measures to increase incentives for employment of elderly people (both addressing jobholders 
and employers). Apart from that, concrete numerical targets were agreed upon, as well as a 
reform of respective monitoring
36
. The latter steps are of procedural nature at first instance 
and do per se not imply a major shift in policies in the more narrow sense.  
 
                                                                                                                                                        
a new part-time pension and by increasing the bonus in the system of the old-age pension for job-holders who 
work beyond statutory retirement age (see Regierungsprogramm 2013, 64). 
33
  See http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/13/st10/st10619-re01.en13.pdf 
34
  See e.g. OTS0164 II, WI 17.10.2013; OTS0179 WI, II 29.10.2013; APA0295 II, WI 24.10.2013; OTS0124 
WI 04.11.2013. 
35
  See e.g. OTS0125 II 12.06.2013; OTS0141 II 17.10.2013; OTS0190 II, CI 29.10.2013. 
36
  This encloses the explicit rule that negotiations on further reforms have to be started if insufficient progress is 
made regarding the defined targets of increasing the actual retirement age and increasing employment rates 
of elderly people. 
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3 Health care 
3.1 System description 
3.1.1 Major reforms that shaped the current system 
The roots of the Austrian sickness insurance go back to the last quarter of the 19
th
 century, 
when in 1887/1888 the industrial accident and health insurance scheme for workers was 
introduced, following the model of Bismarck’s social policy programme.37 After the collapse 
of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy an extension of the coverage of health insurance took 
place to all people with employment contracts, service contracts or waged work (including 
civil servants). Furthermore dependent family members of insured persons were included into 
health insurance. In 1956, the General Social Security Act (Allgemeines 
Sozialversicherungsgesetz/ASVG) replaced the previously valid laws in the field of social 
security. It covers health, work accident and pension insurance for blue- and white-collar 
workers in industry, mining, commerce and trade, transport, agriculture and forestry, and it 
also regulates health insurance for pensioners. Coverage of health insurance increased 
stepwise between the end of WWII and the early 1980s – from about 66% in 1948 to 96% in 
1980. This increased coverage was achieved by a number of different measures, inter alia by 
the introduction of the Act on Health Insurance for Farmers (B-KVG) in 1965 and the Health 
Insurance Act for Self-Employed Tradesmen (GSKVG) in 1966. Furthermore, unrestricted 
access to hospital care, preventive check-ups, examinations for young people and 
rehabilitation were progressively introduced as new services. 
One area that over the last decade has repeatedly been subject to reform debates is the one of 
health care in hospitals and the planning and financing of this sector. Here shared and/or 
overlapping competencies exist between the Federal Republic and the federal provinces 
(Länder). The most important respective regulations are the Act on Hospitals and Sanatoriums 
(Krankenanstalten- und Kuranstaltengesetz/KAKuG, first issued in 1957) at the level of the 
national state and nine different respective implementation laws (“Ausführungsgesetze”) at the 
level of the nine federal provinces. It is important to note that according to Art. 12 (1) 1. of 
the Austrian Constitution the Federal Republic regarding health care in hospitals only has the 
competency to decide on “basic principles” (so-called “Grundsatzgesetzgebung”), which in 
principle gives the federal provinces a rather large degree of discretion in organizing this 
sector via their implementation laws. Still, since the late 1970s several attempts have been 
made to co-ordinate the governance of the hospital sector according to common criterions. 
The formal instrument repeatedly used here are “agreements according to Art. 15a of the 
Austrian Constitution” (so-called “15a Vereinbarung”) between the Federal Republic and the 
federal provinces. In the more recent past, important respective steps were taken with the so-
called “health reform 2005” and the “health reform 2012/2013” (see below for details), 
whereby the latter not only enclosed an amendment of earlier 15a-agreements, but as well a 
new federal “Health-Target Governance Act” (Gesundheits-Zielsteuerungsgesetz/G-ZG).    
3.1.2 System characteristics 
In principle, the health system is under the responsibility of the Federal Republic. One very 
important exception is, as already mentioned above, the hospital sector, where the federal 
provinces are in charge of deciding and enforcing so-called implementation laws 
(Ausführungsgesetze), and where the Federal Republic only has the competency to enact so-
                                                 
37
  The source for the following paragraph is the overview on the history of the Austrian health system by 
Hofmarcher/Rack 2006 (12ff.) and by Hofmarcher (2013).  
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called basic laws (Grundsatzgesetzgebung). For better coordination in this sector, the Federal 
Republic and the Länder have repeatedly concluded mutually binding agreements to ensure 
health care provision within their respective competences. Apart from that, it is important to 
note that in Austria social insurance providers are supposed to be self-governing bodies (so-
called Selbstverwaltungsträger). This implies that they have important regulatory functions, 
especially in respect of outpatient health service. 
The Austrian health sector shows a system of “mixed financing” (see Statistik Austria 2012, 
81ff. for more details). In 2011, approx. 23% of all health expenses (including expenses for 
long-term care) were covered by the private sector, and about 77% by the public sector. 
Regarding the private sector, approx. 74.9% of respective outlays take the form of private out-
of-the pocket payments, 19.8% come from private health insurance providers, about 4.8% 
from non-profit organisations serving households and ca. 0.5% from corporations (other than 
health insurance). Regarding the public sector, about 58% of all expenses are covered by 
health insurance contributions and about come 42% from the tax yield.
38
 
The public share on overall health expenditure increased during the 1990s (starting at ca. 73% 
in 1990) but until recently remained largely stable since 2000 (at a level of about 75 to 
76.3%). 
The Austrian health insurance covers a wide variety of different services, like for example 
primary health care services provided by contract physicians of the Austrian social health 
insurance funds, specialised in-patient and out-patient care, emergency care, dental services, 
prescription medicines, medical devices such as walking aids, wheelchairs or blood glucose 
strips, ambulance services, preventive and health promotion services including vaccinations 
or screening examinations and rehabilitation services. However, patients may face out-of 
pocket payments, for example when using health services which are not included in the 
benefits catalogue of their social health insurance fund (see chapter 3.2.1 below for details).  
Access to public health services is, in principle, organized via an insurance system, covering 
people in gainful employment, persons receiving specific cash benefits (like for example 
benefits from unemployment insurance, from the pension system etc.) and dependent family 
members (see chapter 3.2.1 for details). Overall, about 99% of the Austrian population are 
covered by public health insurance. 
3.1.3 Details on recent reforms 
Recent reforms of the Austrian health system at first instance dealt with questions of 
organizational structures and efficiency, whereas other issues (like for example the question 
of the bandwidth of services covered by public health insurance, health insurance contribution 
rates etc.) were on the agenda to much lesser degree. The aim to improve organisational and 
governance structures is a long standing issue in Austria, given the traditional problem of 
overlapping competencies and very complicated structures of financing, which until recently 
especially prevailed in the area of inpatient (i.e. hospital) care. The so-called “health reform 
2005” led to a gradual institutional re-design (establishing new or replacing existing co-
coordinative institutional bodies)
39
, but without resolving structural problems of shared and/or 
                                                 
38
  Data provided by Statistik Austria according to OECD System of Health Accounts: 
http://www.statistik.at/web_de/static/laufende_gesundheitsausgaben_nach_gesundheitsleistungen_und_-
guetern_leist_055362.xlsx & own calculations. 
39
  By the introduction of a Federal Health Agency, a Federal Health Commission and a Structural Healthcare 
Plan at the national level, and of State Health Funds and Health Platforms at the level of the federal provinces 
(for more details see Hofmarcher/Rack 2006). 
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overlapping competencies and complicated financing structures (see e.g. Czypionka et al. 
2009; 2010; Schelling 2010).  
A new attempt to deal with respective challenges has been made with the recent “Health 
Reform 2012/2013” (Gesundheitsreform 2012/2013). In the Austrian NRP 2013 this reform 
got labelled as being a “milestone”, aiming at better organisation and sustainable finances of 
the health system (Bundeskanzleramt 2013, 6). However, apart from some more or less 
concretely defined goals, this reform at first instance comprises institutional and procedural 
reforms, where it has to be awaited if and to what degree they really achieve the intended 
effects.  
The health reform 2012/2013 comes with a new structure of “joint planning and 
responsibility”. Both at the national level and at the level of the federal provinces 
representatives of the national state, the federal provinces and the health insurance providers 
are represented in joint committees, responsible for planning in the health sector and quality 
assurance. Hereby, in addition to the already existing (but somewhat modified) “Federal State 
Health Commission” (Bundesgesundheitskonferenz - BDK) and the “Federal Provinces Health 
Platforms” (Ländergesundheitsplattformen) new “Target Management Commissions” got 
established both at the level of the Federal Republic and the federal provinces 
(Bundeszielsteuerungskommission – BZK and Landeszielsteuerungskommissionen -LZK). 
Within these commissions, the federal provinces, the health insurance providers and the 
Federal Republic decide on one national and nine regional (i.e. addressing reforms at the level 
of the federal provinces) “target-management contracts” (Zielsteuerungsverträge), enclosing 
infrastructure development, quality assurance and financing. Regarding financial 
sustainability, the different institutions involved agreed on a model where increases in health 
expenditure should not surpass the expected growth of nominal GDP. Furthermore, if 
expenditure exceeds the envisaged level or if “target management contracts” are not put in 
place or implemented properly at the level of the federal provinces financial sanctions may 
apply, where additional costs deriving from a backlog of reform have to be covered by the 
institution identified to be responsible for them (within a so-called arbitration process). 
The first National Target-Management Contract (Bundeszielsteuerungsvertrag), covering 
reforms between the years of 2013 and 2016, was presented in June 2013. The Regional 
Target-Management Contracts (Landeszielsteuerungsverträge) should have been presented by 
the end of September 2013, but four out of nine federal provinces did not present their 
contract in time. 
The National Target-Management Contract (see Bundeszielsteuerungsvertrag 2013) encloses 
more general declarations of intent and announcements of future procedural steps to be taken 
than concrete numerical targets. And if such numerical targets get announced, they do not 
appear to be very ambitious. Concrete targets are the reduction of the rate of hospitalization 
by 1.1% per year or a reduction of the length of hospital stay by 0.8% per year. Per federal 
province, until 2016 only a minimum of two new “innovative ambulant service structures” 
(Neuartige Ambulante Versurgungsstrukturen; NAV; i.e. group practices) are expected to be 
put in place. And it gets announced that each federal province will have to come up with a 
minimum of just one project to transfer selected bundles of day clinic services to the ambulant 
sector. Regarding procedural aspects, the National Target-Management Contract appears to be 
somewhat more ambitious. It gets announced that quality of medical treatment will in future 
be monitored as a matter of routine and that regular assessments on patient satisfaction will 
take place. Furthermore, during 2013 and 2014 new processes aiming at an “alignment of 
service density” are planned to take place, where – inter alia – “parallel structures” and 
“overprovision” are planned to be reduced for the goal of higher efficiency. It is completely 
unclear at the time of writing what the actual impact of these processes will be, as results by 
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respective analyses at the level of the federal provinces and of working groups dealing with 
these topics are not expected before 2014. 
A brief checkup of the Regional Target-Management Contracts already available at the time 
of writing show that they generally do not enclose plans that would imply a significant over-
implementation of the measures and goals agreed upon in the National Target-Management 
Contract.  
Independent experts on health care in their appraisal of the health reform 2012/2013 come to 
different conclusions. Some argue that it lacks concrete measurable and at the same time 
ambitious goals, or even come to the conclusion that most of the reform is nothing more than 
PR-gags. Others stress that it at least comes with a significantly increased transparency of 
planning in health care. Furthermore, they argue that actual reforms implemented according to 
the Regional Target-Management Contracts over the next three years may – at first sight – be 
of the type of “small steps reforms” only, but that these projects may lead to a process of more 
structural reform in the future.
40
 
Overall, it appears to be fair to say that the health reform 2012/2013 is not likely to solve 
some of the evident problems of the Austrian health system, like very high rates of 
hospitalization, very long hospital stays, inefficiency due to parallel structures or sub-optimal 
treatment due to a lack of planning for a clear-cut structure of “points of best service” and a 
rather high geographical differentiation of accessibility of high-quality services  (see 
Hofmarcher 2013; Gönenç et al. 2011) in the short run. However, it appears that these 
problems have at least been recognized and put on the political agenda. At the same time, to 
deal with them within actual reforms, a model of rather small-step adaptation has been put in 
place, whereas ideas of more radical change where not put in place due to the resistance of 
different political players (like the federal provinces and the interest organizations of the 
medical professions).     
One other important reform decided in 2012 is the introduction of a so-called “Electronic 
Health Register” (Elektronischer Gesundheitsakt; ELGA).41 Hereby, individual data about the 
medical history, treatments, prescribed drugs etc. get filed electronically, with (selective) 
access to this data for independent physicians, hospitals and (to a more limited degree) also 
pharmacies. The aim of this information system is to help to prevent suboptimal treatment 
caused by a lack of information on the side of the – in some cases many – treating physicians. 
One other goal is to avoid costly multiple medical examinations and multiple prescription of 
drugs, which is not only inefficient in financial terms but also implicates health risks. The 
decision on the ELGA was accompanied by intense debates, whereby especially physicians, 
and parts of their professional interest organization (the Austrian Medical Chamber) where 
against its introduction. Main arguments presented against the ELGA were that the setup and 
maintaining of this system would turn out to be very costly, that it would come with useless 
additional administrative burdens to be rendered by physicians and that protection of privacy 
would not be guaranteed for patients.
42
 Partly in response to the latter point (protection of 
privacy), it got finally decided that patients can opt-out of the coverage by ELGA, deciding 
that their health data will not get stored within the system. According to the Ministry of 
Health the introduction of the ELGA comes with initial costs of ca. EUR 130 million and with 
                                                 
40
  See e.g. http://medonline.at/2013/kontroverse-diskussion-zur-gesundheitsreform-in-graz/ for an overview in 
respective judgments (retrieved 05.11.2013) 
41
  For the act on the ELGA (BGBl. I No. I 111/2012) see: 
http://www.ris.bka.gv.at/Dokumente/BgblAuth/BGBLA_2012_I_111/BGBLA_2012_I_111.pdf (retrieved 
05.11.2013); for further information: http://www.elga.gv.at/ 
42
  See e.g. OTS0014 CI, II 07.05.2011; APA0213 II, CI 18.05.2011; OTS0142 CI 28.04.2011 ; OTS0024 CI, II 
29.10.2011 ; OTS0024 CI, II 29.10.2011. 
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maintenance costs of EUR 18 million per year. However, at the same time the system, 
according to estimations by the ministry, when fully implemented as from 2017, have a cost 
containing effect of amounting to approximately EUR 129 million per year.
43
 
The new government programme does not announce any further far reaching and structural 
reforms, but only very limited new measures. The only point really worth mentioning here is 
that a new concept for child and adolescent psychiatry should get developed until the end of 
2015. This is an area were the Austrian health system up to now shows substantial deficits.
44
 
3.2 Assessment of strengths and weaknesses 
3.2.1 Coverage and access to services 
About 99% of the Austrian population are covered by the social health insurance (see as well 
Fuchs 2009), which is – in principle –  organised as a compulsory insurance for people in 
gainful employment and for people receiving cash benefits from systems of social protection 
(like pensions or unemployment benefits). However, health insurance in Austria goes far 
beyond the scope of insurance for employed persons and people receiving cash benefits from 
social insurance since, in addition to the directly insured parties, it also covers dependent 
members of their families. About one third of the persons covered by the statutory health 
insurance are co-insured family members who do not pay contributions of their own (e.g. 
children, housewives/househusbands). Periods without insurance appear to be a short-time 
phenomenon in many cases (see for more details Fuchs 2009, 329), and people who are not 
covered by health insurance may opt in to the system at their own expense (however, some 
waiting periods may apply here.). Furthermore, for people without insurance but receiving 
means-tested Social Assistance, the Social Assistance providers used to cover the cost for 
health care services. Traditional Social Assistance was replaced by the so-called Guaranteed 
Minimum Income scheme (GMI) as from September 2010 and benefit recipients are now 
included in normal health insurance. The latter is a positive step, as there is some evidence 
that the earlier “special” scheme for recipients of Social Assistance came along with social 
stigmatisation and – in some cases – with below standard health treatment. 
Patients can choose their family physician and have free access to most other forms of 
medical care. In contrast to many other countries, there is no obligation in Austria to enrol 
with a specific physician or to consult them prior to accessing specialised (inpatient) 
treatment, which means that physicians have no gate-keeping function. It is also possible to 
consult ambulatory outpatient departments of hospitals without prior consent of the family 
physician or one’s health insurance fund. 
However, take-up of selected health care services may be linked to special conditions or 
prerequisites such as age or type of illness or may also involve co-payments. These may be 
calculated according to fixed rates (e.g., a prescription fee for medicines, in 2013: EUR 5.30) 
or as percentages (e.g., a 20% co-payment for most services provided by physicians for 
persons insured with certain health insurance funds). Patients will also face out-of pocket 
payments when using health services which are not included in the benefits catalogue of their 
social health insurance fund. These include, for instance, payments for OTC medicines, daily 
allowances for in-patient care (currently – depending on the federal province – between 12 
and 19 EUR per day for the first 28 days in hospital per year), expenditure for certain dental 
services or for the services of physicians who have no contract with the social health 
insurance fund in question. Payments made for the latter may partially be refunded to the 
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  OTS0331 II 10.11.2011. 
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  See e.g. http://derstandard.at/1378249007558/Hoher-Bedarf-grosse-Versorgungsdefizite 
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insured person by their social health insurance fund. Irrespective of some general duties for 
private co-payments etc. the degree of equity in accessing services in Austria appears to very 
high (see as well OECD 2011a, 30; Hofmarcher 2013, 263ff.). This is inter alia caused by the 
fact that for persons with special needs, for persons with low income or for persons who are 
chronically ill some exemptions from co-payments exist. Here, the most important one is the 
exemption from the obligation of paying the prescription fees for medicines, which currently 
applies for about a quarter of the insured population.  
According to assessments by international organisations (see e.g. OECD 2011a) and national 
experts (see. e.g. Habl et al. 2010) access to services in Austria – at least from an international 
comparative point of view – to a comparatively low degree depends on the overall social 
situation of the patient. According to data provided by EU-SILC, less than 1% of the lowest 
income quintile in Austria reports unmet needs for medical examination in Austria for 
financial reasons, which holds for nearly 5% at average of EU-27 (indicator hlth_silc_08). 
And as well self-reported unmet needs of dental examinations due to financial reasons of the 
lowest income quintile, changing between ca. 2.5% and 4% over the years, is considerably 
lower than at average of EU-27 (ca. 7% to 8%) (Indicator hlth_silc_09). Furthermore, 
different surveys show a high generally very high satisfaction of the population with the 
overall health system (see Hofmarcher 2013, 263ff.). 
Still, this does not mean that no problems would exist regarding access to health services (see 
Hofmarcher 2013, 268ff. for an overview), for example: 
- Reportedly, waiting times for some surgeries tend to be shorter for patients with an 
additional private insurance. 
- Regarding some services, offers and accessibility vary to a large degree between 
different regions. Regional deficits are especially evident regarding ambulatory 
rehabilitation, and here in particular in the area of neuro-rehabilitation, concerning 
palliative services, and as well regarding psychiatric care and psychological care – 
with regional deficits especially existing for ambulatory and out-patient services and 
concerning children and youngsters. 
- Furthermore, regional differences as well exist regarding the degree of development of 
the general spectrum of health services, with e.g. the federal provinces of Vienna and 
Upper Austria showing a higher scope of services than federal provinces with a lower 
GDP per head. 
- More detailed analyses on the actual “social selectivity” of the health system are very 
rare. However, e.g. research on the likelihood of attending a dentist in Austria is by 
40% higher in the highest income decile than in the lowest income decile, which is – 
from an international comparative point of view – a very high degree of differentiation 
(see Hofmarcher 2013, 268).  
3.2.2 Quality and performance indicators 
Quality and performance indicators to some degree point towards a more problematic 
situation than one would expect on the background of high coverage rates, high (self-
reported) accessibility and rather high equality in access to health services (outlined above). 
Both for men and women, numbers for healthy life years in percentage of the total life 
expectancy are considerably lower than at average of EU-27 (see Table 3). Given the fact that 
the overall life expectancy is rather high in Austria, the absolute number non-healthy life 
years is rather high in Austria. This inter alia indicates deficits within health prevention, 
which at the same time is likely to imply high burdens and financial costs within the area of 
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long-term care (see below Chapter 4; for the case of Austria as well Aiginger 2011). Although 
the indicator of “healthy live years” derives from subjective self-assessment respective results 
should be interpreted with caution
45
, this results still indicate a substantial need for 
improvement (see as well Hofmarcher 2013, 270ff.). According to an assessment by the 
OECD (OECD 2010), using non-parametric methods (so-called Data Envelopment Analysis), 
life expectancy in Austria could be by about 2.5 years higher if resources would be used as 
efficient as in the countries identified as benchmarks. At the same time, according to these 
calculations, the current life expectancy could have been reached with health expenditure 
being by 25% lower than they actually are. Other related calculations come to largely similar 
results (see Hofmarcher 2013,  271) and show at the same time that the efficiency of the funds 
allocated within the health system (measured as “lost” life-years) to a considerable degree 
vary between the different Austrian federal provinces (see ibid., 273; Gönenç et al. 2011). 
Table 3:  Life expectancy and healthy life years; 2004-2011 
 
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
 
Life expectancy in absolute value at birth 
Females 
 EU-27 81.5 81.6 82 82.2 82.4 82.6 82.9 83.2 
Austria 82.1 82.2 82.8 83.1 83.3 83.2 83.5 83.9 
Males 
 EU-27 75.2 75.4 75.8 76.1 76.4 76.7 77 77.5 
Austria 76.4 76.6 77.1 77.4 77.8 77.6 77.9 78.3 
  
 
Healthy life years in absolute value at birth  
Females 
 EU-27 : 62.5 62.5 62.6 62.2 62 62.7 62.2 
Austria 60.4 60.1 61 61.5 59.7 60.8 60.7 60.4 
Males 
 EU-27 : 61.1 61.8 61.7 61.1 61.3 61.9 61.8 
Austria 58.3 58.2 58.7 58.7 58.3 59.5 59.5 59.8 
  
 
Healthy life years at birth in percentage of the total life expectancy 
Females 
 EU-27 : 76.6 76.3 76.1 75.5 75.1 75.7 74.8 
Austria 73.5 73.1 73.7 73.9 71.6 73.1 72.8 71.9 
Males 
 EU-27 : 81 81.5 81.1 80 79.9 80.4 79.8 
Austria 76.3 75.9 76.1 75.9 75 76.7 76.4 76.3 
Source: Eurostat Database, hlth_hlye 
 
Evidently, the quality of health services matters for the efficiency of the health system. Both 
within politicians and the population there is a “widely shared belief that health services are of 
a high quality in Austria” (Gönenç et al. 2011, 31). Yet, national health experts observe that 
this assertion is only to a very low degree backed by objective criteria or indicators, as 
respective data until recently scarcely have been available: “The Austrian system’s operating 
without standard quality indicators is indeed one of its distinct characteristics” (ibid.). 
Furthermore, according to the rather limited information that is available, Austria repeatedly 
is not an international best performer regarding a number of quality indicators (see 
Hofmarcher 2013, 271ff. for an overview): 
- Child mortality could be reduced to a considerable degree over the last three decades, 
but it is still somewhat higher than at average of EU-15 and it substantially surpasses 
the one in the respective best-performing European countries. 
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- Austria during the last decades succeeded in reducing mortality rates from certain 
frequent diseases clearly below OECD averages, and below averages in other high 
income countries such as Sweden, Denmark and the Netherlands (notably from 
infectious diseases, and from the diseases of the digestive and respiratory system). In 
other areas, outcomes are similar to comparable countries (such as the diseases of the 
circulatory and genitor-urinary systems, and cancers) (see as well Gönenç et al. 2011, 
31). At the same time the age-standardised 5-year survival rate of breast cancer is now 
lower than at OECD-average, as in other countries the respective situation improved to 
an even higher degree than in Austria. A related picture applies for example for the 
rate of cardiac death within 30 days after a hospital stay (see Hofmarcher 2013, 275). 
- Further problems appear to be evident regarding health prevention. The Austrian 
system is for example characterized by a comparatively limited outreach of certain 
important vaccination programmes.
46
 As a result, the incidence of a serious disease 
such as hepatitis B is higher than in comparable countries (Gönenç et al. 2011, 32). 
From a more general perspective, outlays for health prevention (1.8% of overall health 
spending) are considerably lower in Austria than at average of EU-27 (2.9% of overall 
health spending) (Aiginger 2011; Hofmarcher 2013, 277). 
- At first sight, standard health-related lifestyle elements in Austria do not differ 
significantly from OECD averages. At closer examination however, there are 
especially three important sources of concerns. alcohol consumption, smoking, and 
diet (OECD 2011a, 110; Gönenç et al. 2011, 37; Hofmarcher 2013, 275ff.). According 
to respective data, Austria has one of the highest rates of alcohol consumption among 
the population above 15. Smoking rates remain at high levels, while they have 
declined in other countries. In contrast, Austria has one of the lowest daily fruit eating 
among the 15 years old. Rates of physical activity are also below OECD averages. As 
a result, overweight rates (especially as well of young persons) have strongly 
increased in the 2000s, at a much higher pace than in most other countries. The 
increase in obesity rates was also above OECD averages. 
- One other point of concern is the topic of inequality in health-related behaviours and 
outcomes. Overall, it appears that respective differentiations are rather low in Austria 
from an international comparative point of view, but regarding a number of parameters 
they are still substantial and some of them even point to the direction of increasing 
social stratification of health-related behaviour and outcomes (see for an overview 
Hofmarcher 2013, 275ff.; Gönenç et al. 201, 40). 
- The Austrian health system shows an excessive bias towards hospital services. The 
number of acute beds is (although it got reduced) extremely high by international 
standards, as is the number of hospital discharges. On the positive side, the average 
length of stay in hospital could be reduced to some degree over the last decade, and it 
actually is somewhat shorter than at average of EU-25 (OECD 2012, 81). 
3.2.3 Sustainability 
The total expenditure on health care (excluding expenditure on long-term care) rose from 
7.5% in 1990 to 8.8% of GDP in 1999 and to 9.1% in 2004. Between 2004 and 2008 
respective numbers remained rather stable (9.1% in 2008), but spending in % of GDP 
increased significantly in 2009 (9.6%) – at first instance due to a decline of the GDP during 
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the financial and economic crisis (whereas additional growth in expenditure was lower than in 
earlier years). In 2010, spending for health amounted to 9.5% of GDP, in 2011 to 9.2% and in 
2012 again to 9.5%. 
The declared goals of the above mentioned “health reform 2012/2013” are twofold: To sustain 
or (regarding specific points) even to enhance quality of healthcare, and at the same time to 
guarantee for cost containment.  The different institutions involved (the Federal Republic, the 
Main Association of Austrian Social Security Institutions and the different Health Insurance 
Organizations, as well as the Federal Provinces) agreed on a model where increases in health 
expenditure should not surpass the expected growth of nominal GDP (3.6% until 2016). 
According to data by the Ministry of Health, “the health reform 2012/2013” – when compared 
to earlier budget forecasts – will lead to cuts by social insurance providers amounting to a 
sum of 1.372 billion EUR. Furthermore, it got announced that cuts in respective spending by 
the federal provinces regarding the hospital sector are expected to amount to a sum of up to 
EUR 2.058 billion until 2016 (BMG 2012). From a mid-term perspective, the Federal 
Ministry of Health announced that the health reform 2012/2013 – by adjusting the growth of 
health spending to the growth of nominal GDP – will lead to a cost containment amounting to 
11 billion EUR until 2020. However, critics charged that these numbers are premised on a too 
pessimistic “alternative budget scenario” which would take place without the reform, and that 
the goals of cost containment are at the same time not very ambitious. The envisaged effects 
of cost containment are predicted according to the assumption that yearly nominal growth for 
health care would amount to ca. 4.2% without the reform, and to ca. 3.6% with the reform. 
However, estimated growth rates in the “alternative budget scenario” are much higher than 
they actually were over the last two decades.
47
   
3.2.4 Summary  
Overall, an assessment of strengths and weaknesses of the Austrian health system comes to 
mixed results. One the one hand, equality in access to health services appears to be rather high 
by international standards, which as well holds for general availability and quality of services 
(though objective data on the latter are rather scarcely available for Austria). On the other 
hand, integration between different strands of health services (of the inpatient, outpatient and 
ambulant type) shows deficits, deriving from traditionally complicated structures of planning, 
coming along with competencies split (and partly shared) between different actors and 
institutions and lacking overall structural planning. This not only implies that it is sometimes 
difficult for patients to select between optimal sources of treatment, but as well comes with 
problems of efficiency and sustainability. Furthermore, regarding health prevention and as 
well health outcomes (measured according to international standard indicators) Austria 
repeatedly does not belong to the group of international best performers. The recent “health 
reform 2012/2013” has put many of these problematic issues on the agenda. However, given 
the fact that this reform at first instance aims at stepwise improvement, to be reached via 
institutional and procedural innovations now enacted, the actual future outreach and impact of 
the reform is rather unclear at the time of writing. Pessimists expect rather limited 
improvements only, whereas optimists hope that first positive steps will gain momentum, 
leading to de facto more widespread steps of reform.  
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3.3 Reform debates 
The question of a structural and encompassing reform of the health system is a long-standing 
issue in Austria (see the ASISP reports for 2009 and 2010: Fink 2009; Fink 2010). Respective 
debates took place on the background of a very complicated organisational structure, entailing 
a considerable decentralisation of powers and multiple financing instruments. The latter 
continued to apply irrespective of the reforms of 2005, which were aimed at improving 
integrated planning (for more details see Hofmarcher/Rack 2006; Hofmarcher 2013; 
Trukeschitz et al. 2013). Given the limited actual positive effects of the “health care reform 
2005” the issue of a structural reform of the health system remained on the agenda and 
respective negotiations repeatedly took place between the health insurance providers, the 
interest organisations of the physicians, the Federal Republic and the federal provinces. 
However, for a long time it appeared that progress made within these negotiations was largely 
absent due to differences deriving from the structural interests of different stakeholders 
involved. In October 2011 representatives of the federal provinces announced that an 
agreement on how to reform the competencies within the health sector should not be expected 
before the mid of 2012, or – more likely – only towards the end of the year 2012.48 The then 
dominating “dawdling around” may be explained by the fact that the respective “agreement 
pursuant to Article 15a” between the Federal Republic and the federal provinces, dealing with 
respective issues, was anyhow planned to remain applicable until the end of 2013 and some 
stakeholders were not really willing to change something structural before that date. 
Then, in February 2012, the Austrian Government presented its so-called “consolidation 
package” on public budgets, which to some degree speeded up things regarding the envisaged 
health care reform. In the context of this consolidation package the Federal Republic, the 
federal provinces and the Association of Austrian Social Security Institutions (Hauptverband 
der Sozialversicherungsträger) agreed on the above mentioned numerical targets of cost-
containment.
49
 After that, additional and rather lengthy negotiations followed, leading to the 
“National Target-Management Contract” (Bundeszielsteuerungsvertrag), presented in June 
2013. 
As already sketched out above, the “health reform 2012/2013” addresses many of the 
challenges repeatedly stressed by international organisations like the OECD, national health 
experts and as well the EU country specific recommendations within the Europe 2020 
strategy: the lack of integrated mechanisms of planning and financing, a strong bias towards 
inpatient services, deficits in health prevention etc. In institutional terms, the Health Reform 
2012/2013 did not really overcome the problem of shared competencies and it will not lead to 
true “one-stop financing”, as repeatedly urged by national experts and the OECD (see for 
example: Czypionka et al. 2009; 2010; Schelling 2010; OECD 2011a; see as well Trukeschitz 
et al. 2013). Inter alia for this reason, some experts and as well political players, especially 
opposition parties
50
 and the interest organisations of the physicians
51
, remained sceptical 
about the likely future impact of the reform. However, the intensity of reform debates on the 
health system declined after the principal decisions on the reform 2012/2013 had been taken, 
and for example the presentation of the “target-management contracts” 
(Zielsteuerungsverträge) at the level of the federal provinces in late 2013 did not gain much 
public attention. 
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  APA0285 II, WI 15.02.2012. 
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  See e.g. OTS0258 II 26.04.2013.  
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Interestingly and irrespective of rather widespread reform debates in the recent years one 
topic did only get addressed rather scarcely in an explicit way, which is the one of equality of 
access to health services and the social stratification of health outcomes. The latter point has 
only been addressed insofar, that respective stakeholders and decision makers repeatedly 
stated that the structural reform under discussion and cost containment measures should not 
lead to restricted access to health care, but should have their emphasis on increasing 
efficiency at different levels. 
Regarding country-specific recommendations, CSR 4 encloses the following: “Effectively 
implement the recent reforms of the health care system to make sure that the expected cost 
efficiency gains materialise.” It appears to be logical to keep this CSR, as the implementation 
of the Health Reform 2012/2013 is a lengthy and stepwise process. It could be added that 
effects should be closely monitored. 
  




4 Long-term care 
4.1 System description 
4.1.1 Major reforms that shaped the current system 
Long-term care is a rather young distinct area of social policy in Austria. It was only in 1993, 
when the two major cornerstones of the Austrian long-term care regime got introduced. The 
first one consists of the Federal Long-Term Care Allowance Act (Bundespflegegeldgesetz, 
BPGG)
52
, codifying cash benefits for people in need of long-term care. The second one, as 
well decided in 1993, is an “agreement according to article 15a of the Austrian Constitutional 
Act” on measures for people in need of long-term care, agreed upon between the Federal 
Republic and the federal provinces.
53
 According to this agreement, the federal provinces have 
to develop an adequate and comprehensive system of institutional, semi-institutional and 
home-based care services with full geographical coverage. However, he binding force of this 
agreement is rather limited as there are no sanctions attached.  
4.1.2 System characteristics 
The Austrian system of long-term care has a twofold design, consisting of cash benefits on the 
one hand, and publicly organised long-term care services on the other hand (see Österle 2013 
for an overview). The respective cash benefit is called long-term care benefit (Pflegegeld). As 
from the beginning of 2012 long-term care benefits, originally introduced in 1993, fall within 
the sole competency of the Federal Republic, whereas before as well the federal provinces 
granted this kind of benefit (for specific groups). Pflegegeld is granted without means testing 
(against income or assets) and according to seven different levels, corresponding to a 
categorisation of seven different levels of individual care requirements / the health status of 
the person in need of care. The benefit currently amounts to EUR 154.20 per month in level 1 
(the lowest level), but may be as high as EUR 1,665.80 in level 7. These cash benefits are 
intended to be used to buy formal care services from public or private providers or to 
reimburse informal care giving. However, it is not being controlled for what purposes long-
term care benefits are actually used by the benefit recipients. 
In addition, pursuant to the above mentioned agreement according to Article 15a of the 
Federal Constitution Act (endorsed in 1993) the federal provinces are responsible for 
establishing and upgrading a decentralised and nationwide delivery of institutional inpatient, 
ambulatory, semi-outpatient and outpatient (i.e. at-home) care services. These services are de 
facto implemented in cooperation with municipalities and not-for-profit organisations of the 
so-called intermediary sector, i.e. social NGOs of different types (for an overview see e.g. 
Riedel/Kraus 2010, 21ff. Biwald et al. 2011; Trukeschitz et al. 2013). Services get financed 
by (co-)payments of persons in need for long-term care (who usually at the same time get the 
long-term care cash benefit, intended to partly cover these outlays) and by the general budgets 
of the federal provinces and municipalities (on a needs-tested basis in case of insufficient 
financial resources of the person in need for long-term care). 
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  BGBl. Nr. 866/1993; see: 
http://www.ris.bka.gv.at/GeltendeFassung.wxe?Abfrage=Bundesnormen&Gesetzesnummer=10001280 
(retrieved 25.10.2013) 
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Financing of long-term cash benefits comes from the general budget of the federal state, 
public financing of benefits in kind from the budgets of the federal provinces and 
municipalities, and, via the general fiscal equalisation scheme (Finanzlastenausgleich)  and 
the so-called Long-term Care Funds (Pflegefond), introduced in 2011, as well from the budget 
of the federal state. This means that public spending on long-term care (in the more narrow 
sense, i.e. without care provided by the health system) is 100% tax financed in Austria. 
The issue of data on actual public and private spending (see as well Trukeschitz/Schneider 
2012) for LTC is somewhat tricky in the case of Austria, as for a long time different types of 
documentation existed in the different federal provinces so that within national documentation 
data repeatedly derived from estimations only. According to data provided by Statistik Austria 
in its time-series on LTC spending as operationalized within the OECD System of Health 
Accounts overall spending for long-term care increased from 0.95% of GDP in 1990 to about 
1.3% of GDP in 1994 (when long-term care cash benefits were introduced) (see Annex Table 
2). Thereafter, this number remained largely stable until 2008 but increased to about 1.56% in 
2009 and then remained at about the same level thereafter. The growth effect in 2009 
occurred due to decreasing GDP but also due to a raise of the benefit levels of long-term care 
cash benefits, as decided in 2005 and 2008, and a growing number of people in need for long-
term care.
54
 In 1994 about 85% of all spending on long-term care was covered by the public 
sector, whereas about 15% came from private sources. The public share somewhat decreased 
during the following years (down to about 79.8% in 2004), but then remained largely stable 
and increased somewhat in 2010 and 2011 (to about 81 to 82%). Over the last decade the 
number of recipients of long-term-care cash benefits (plus 100,000 or plus 33% between 1999 
and 2012) has increased to much larger degree than overall spending for LTC in % of GDP, 
which has been rising by about 19.5% during the same time. 
Recently, new data on LTC-spending of the federal provinces has been made available via the 
so-called “Long-term Care Database”, implemented as from 2012 as part of the “Act on the 
long-term care funds” (see below chapter 4.1.3). These data indicate somewhat higher total 
spending on LTC than the data within the above mentioned time-series of Statistik Austria. 
According to the new data in 2011 total spending for LTC amounted to 1.77% of GDP (see 
Annex Table 2). Of this total sum 0.81% percentage points were allotted to cash benefits, 
0.96% to benefits in kind/services provided by the federal provinces. The latter as well 
includes funds coming from co-payments by persons receiving respective services or by their 
relatives and other revenues of the federal provinces from other sources, which together 
amount to ca. 0.41% of GDP. 
4.1.3 Details on recent reforms in the past 2-3 years 
Several reforms took place in the area of long-term care over the last years, however without 
changing the major institutional setting of the system in place. The only major exception, 
decided within a reform package on the so-called “long-term care fund” (Pflegefonds), was 
that long-term care cash benefits (Pflegegeld) as from 2012 fall within the sole competency of 
the Federal Republic. Before, specific groups
55
 were granted this benefit by the federal 
provinces. This reform came with a reduction of institutions responsible for the grading of 
care necessities in individual cases (according to the given seven-level model) from 303 (sic!) 
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  At first instance co-insured persons like children and homekeepers, persons receiving benefits from the 
minimum income schemes of the federal provinces and employed persons.  
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to eight. However, the “explanatory notes” (“Materialien”) on the respective bill do not 
announce to what degree administration costs are expected to be reduced by this measure.
56
 
Overall, the main rationale for the decision on the Long-term care Funds Act 
(Pflegefondsgesetz; BGBl. I Nr. 57/2011)
57
 was not the one to improve organisational 
structures, but to ensure mid-term financial feasibility of the system in place. During 2010, it 
got evident that federal provinces and municipalities faced increasing problems in financing 
intra- and extramural benefits in kind. Against this background the Federal Republic, the 
federal provinces and the municipalities agreed in March 2011 on the introduction of a joint 
“long-term care fund”, planned to serve as an interim solution for respective financing 
problems until 2014. In sum, EUR 685 million were made available for the time until 2014, of 
which 2/3 are to be financed by the Federal Republic and 1/3 by the federal provinces and the 
municipalities. In February 2012 it got decided to prolong the long-term care fund until 2016, 
and that hereby additional funds of EUR 650 million will be made available. 
 
4.2 Assessment of strengths and weaknesses 
4.2.1 Coverage and access to services 
As already mentioned above LTC cash benefits (Pflegegeld) in Austria is not means tested in 
terms of personal or family income or assets, but in principle granted as a universal benefit. 
At the same time seven different levels apply, structured according to the health conditions 
and the amount of care requirements of the respective person.  
In contrast, access to LTC benefits in kind and LTC services is in principle not free of charge. 
Here, means testing applies, where all kinds of personal income, including LTC cash benefits 
and assets (which may get capitalized), are taken into account. Only if the respective services 
cannot be financed via these resources, they – or the remaining part – of respective costs get 
financed by the federal provinces within Social Assistance and the Guaranteed Minimum 
Income Scheme. Furthermore, in most federal provinces a scheme of so-called 
“Familienregress” has been in place, which as well obliged relatives of persons in need for 
institutional care to means-tested co-payments, if respective costs could not be covered via 
personal income (incl. LTC cash benefits) and capitalization of assets of persons in need for 
LTC. These schemes of “Familienregress” got abolished step by step in all federal provinces, 
but in Styria co-payments by children for parents (and for parents for children) in need for 
institutional LTC got re-introduced in summer 2011.
58
 
Information on regional disparities of accessibility of services until recently lacked validity, as 
the federal provinces applied different models of documentation implying that data in a 
number of cases was not directly comparable. Within the Long-term care Funds Act of 2011 
(see above) it got as well decided that a so-called “long-term care database” will be 
introduced. The long-term care database covers information on: a. The number of persons 
receiving different types of benefits in kind and services (mobile/outpatient care, 
stationary/in-patient care, semi-stationary care, short-term (inpatient) care, alternative 
housing, case- and care management; b.  Full-time equivalents of care personnel used to fulfil 
respective tasks; c. Spending for respective benefits in kind and services (according to two 
variants: gross=total; net=gross minus co-payments by persons receiving respective services 
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or by their relatives and minus other revenues – e.g. transfers by the federal provinces health 
funds).  
Table 4 shows the “standard format”, in which respective data is provided by Statistics 
Austria. What has to be taken into account is that these numbers only address services 
financed or co-financed via Social Assistance or Guaranteed Minimum Income (GMI).
59
 This 
means that services financed by people in need of long-term care, who can to 100% afford 
respective services from their own income or via the capitalisation of assets, are not covered 
in respective data. Evidently, the data presented in the “standard format” of Statistics Austria 
per se is not very informative. What gets evident is that some services appear to be completely 
missing in some federal provinces (short-term inpatient care; alternative dwellings; case- and 
care-management) and that the proportion between persons covered by different kinds of 
services within one federal province varies to a large degree when the federal provinces are 
compared to each other. 
Table 4: Care Services
1
) of the Federal Provinces 
2
) 2011 

















Persons looked after 3) 
Total 140,157  74,789  5,053  5,513  11,021  65,938  
Burgenland 4,611  2,018  149  0  0  0  
Carinthia 10,521  5,018  64  402  79  1,483  
Lower Austria 25,326  11,924  433  2,416  0  15,571  
Upper Austria 31,150  15,681  852  9  8  9,500  
Salzburg 5,779  3,861  544  420  0  3,027  
Styria 15,044  15,473  253  0  654  0  
Tyrol 8,295  5,400  337  782  0  5,279  
Vorarlberg 12,531  2,054  421  505  120  298  
Vienna 26,900  13,360  2,000  979  10,160  30,780  
 
Care Attendants (full-time equivalents) 
4
) 
Total 11,945.7  30,572.6  (395.6) (249.3) (475.3) (702.6) 
Burgenland 242.2  818.7  16.8  0.0  0.0  0.0  
Carinthia 1,045.0  1,596.8  4.4  n.a. 14.1  4.0  
Lower Austria 2,705.0  4,673.0  23.5  18.3  0.0  489.0  
Upper Austria 1,305.6  5,351.8  43.9  1.0  2.1  38.7  
Salzburg 591.9  1,868.9  32.8  n.a. 0.0  14.2  
Styria 943.0  4,257.4  19.1  0.0  45.1  0.0  
Tyrol 557.1  2,591.3  29.1  n.a. 0.0  n.a. 
Vorarlberg 166.9  1,176.7  n.a. n.a. n.a. 7.7  
Vienna 4,389.0  8,238.0  226.0  230.0  414.0  149.0  
 
Source: STATISTIK AUSTRIA, Pflegedienstleistungsstatistik. Prepared 31.01.2013; - 1) Services of long-
term care, if (co-)financed by funds of Social Assistance and Guaranteed Minimum Income (GMI) 
Respectively; services without "help for disabled" (Behindertenhilfe) and "basic maintenance" 
(Grundversorgung). - 2) If data is not available for all federal provinces (n.a.), then the "total" refers to the 
remaining federal provinces (in brackets). -3) Total number in the year under review (yearly sum). -4) 
Number at the end of the year under review (31.12.). 
To get a closer picture of the respective situation, the number on persons looked after can be 
set into proportion with the number of the recipients of long-term care cash benefits (as a 
proxy for the number of people in need for long-term care). In doing so, “coverage rates” for 
different kinds of long-term care services can be calculated (Table 5).  
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Table 5: Care Services
1)
 of the Federal Provinces 2011; coverage rates according to 
number of recipients of long-term care cash benefits (Pflegegeld) 
2)
 



























Total 438,449 31.97  17.06  1.15  1.26  2.51  15.04  
Burgenland 19,734 23.37  10.23  0.76  0.00  0.00  0.00  
Carinthia 33,634 31.28  14.92  0.19  1.20  0.23  4.41  
Lower 
Austria 85,309 29.69  13.98  0.51  2.83  0.00  18.25  
Upper 
Austria 70,956 43.90  22.10  1.20  0.01  0.01  13.39  
Salzburg 23,985 24.09  16.10  2.27  1.75  0.00  12.62  
Styria 73,792 20.39  20.97  0.34  0.00  0.89  0.00  
Tyrol 29,412 28.20  18.36  1.15  2.66  0.00  17.95  
Vorarlberg 16,261 77.06  12.63  2.59  3.11  0.74  1.83  
Vienna 85,366 31.51  15.65  2.34  1.15  11.90  36.06  
Source: STATISTIK AUSTRIA, Pflegedienstleistungsstatistik; Prepared 31.01.2013 & own calculations - 1) 
Services of long-term care, if (co-)financed by funds of Social Assistance and Guaranteed Minimum Income 
(GMI) respectively; services without "help for disabled" (Behindertenhilfe) and "basic maintenance" 
(Grundversorgung). 2) The number of recipients of long-term care cash benefits serves as a proxy for people in 
need of care. 
Evidently, coverage rates on out- and inpatient services differ to a very substantial degree 
between the federal provinces. The same holds for the reported numbers of care-attendants in 
long-term care, when they get adjusted to the size of the likely demand (according to the 
proxy of recipients of long-term care cash benefits) and then indexed (see Table 6 below). 
 
Table 6: Care Attendants (full-time equivalents) per number of recipients of long-term care 


























Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Burgenla
nd 45.0 59.5 94.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Carinthia 114.0 68.1 14.5 n.a. 38.6 7.4 
Lower 
Austria 116.4 78.6 30.5 37.7 0.0 357.7 
Upper 
Austria 67.5 108.2 68.5 2.5 2.8 34.1 
Salzburg 90.6 111.7 151.7 n.a. 0.0 37.0 
Styria 46.9 82.7 28.7 0.0 56.4 0.0 
Tyrol 69.5 126.4 109.7 n.a. 0.0 n.a. 
Vorarlbe
rg 37.7 103.8 n.a. n.a. n.a. 29.5 
Vienna 188.7 138.4 293.4 473.8 447.4 108.9 
Source: STATISTIK AUSTRIA, Pflegedienstleistungsstatistik. Prepared 31.01.2013; & own calculations; 1) 
Number at the end of the year under review (31.12.) & own calculations. 
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Overall, the evident large variation of coverage rates of LTC benefits in kind and LTC 
services points to the direction that substantial deficits are likely in a number of federal 
provinces. However, more encompassing assessments on this point are largely missing at the 
time of writing (see as well Österle 2013).  
4.2.2 Quality and performance indicators 
For institutional care in Austria no common system for quality assurance and documentation 
exists. The nine federal provinces enacted different kinds of regulation on this issue (for an 
overview see BMASK 2012, 38ff.) but it is unclear if and to what degree these regulations 
actually guarantee high quality standards within institutional care, as respective outcome 
documentations are not available publicly on a regular basis. 
Concerning long-term care in private households, first results are now available from an 
assessment organised by the Federal Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs and Consumer 
Protection (see BMASK 2012a, 24ff.). Hereby, within home visits the quality of long-term 
care got assessed according to a three stage scale (A, B, C), whereby in stage C two subtypes 
exist (C+ and C-).
60
 The respective situation got appraised according to the following 
domains: 1. functionality of the housing situation; 2. body care and hygiene; 3. quality 
medical-nursing care; 4. nutrition incl. liquid intake; 5. housing situation concerning hygiene; 
6. activities and participation in social life. Overall 5,276 home visits where conducted 
between August and December 2012 and the results of the assessment where overwhelmingly 
positive (see BMASK 2012, 30ff.). In none of the 6 dimensions gravely problematic 
situations (C- und C+) occurred in more than 0.7% of all cases. Level B classifications applies 
to ca. 1.5 to 3.5 for all cases in all but one domain, namely functionality of housing, where the 
situation turned out to be somewhat problematic in about 10.5% of all home visits. 
Consequently, A-ratings were given in more than 95% of the cases in all domains except of 
functionality of housing (ca. 89%). 
However, these positive results should be interpreted with caution. The reason for this is that 
only 9.4% of all the home visits in this assessment took place in households with benefit 
recipients of long-term care cash benefits (Pflegegeld) of the level five or higher (whereas in 
reality this group amounts to ca. 15.5% of all recipients of respective benefits). In other 
words: persons with comparatively high need of care are somewhat underrepresented. 
Furthermore, no breakdown is presented according to the seven different benefit levels of 
Pflegegeld (associated with different health status and need for care). 
Overall, it appears to be fair to say that, irrespective of first steps taken to improve the 
documentation of and assurance of quality within home-based care further steps should be 
taken in this respect. This is especially true given the situation that about 60% of all recipients 
of long-term care cash benefits are looked after by relatives and friends only
61
 (see Chart 2), 
and do not make use of any kind of institutional care, whereby the latter often serves as a kind 
of quality assurance in cases of mixed care arrangements. 
  
                                                 
60
  The assessment tool is a further developed version of ASCOT (Adult Social Care Outcomes Toolkit), 
originally developed in the UK. 
61
  For a more detailed  discussion on home care in Austria see Österle/Bauer 2012. 
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Chart 2: Long-term care arrangements 2013 
 
Source: Federal Ministry for Labour, Social Affairs and Consumer Protection (BMASK) 
 
4.2.3 Sustainability 
Apart of estimations by the OECD (see e.g. OECD 2013) and the European Commission 
(European Commission  2012) the most cited national assessment estimating future demand 
(and future spending) on long-term care in Austria got presented by WIFO in 2008 
(Mühlberger et al. 2008). This study presents a number of different scenarios for the years 
2020 and 2030. According to the base-scenario (taking into account demographic changes 
only) the number of recipients of long-term care cash benefits will rise from 393,120 in 2006 
to 631,426 in 2030, or by 60.6%. The most optimistic estimations of the “better-health 
scenario” (lower bound scenario of this scenario) indicate an increase to 536,041 recipients of 
long-term care cash benefits, or by 36.35%. In combination of different scenarios of the 
demand- and the supply-side real overall public spending according to the lower bound 
scenario will rise by 66% until 2030, according to the middle scenario by 159.7% and 
according to the upper bound scenario by 206.5% (see ibid. 34). The by far larger part of 
these increases derives from additional spending for benefits in kind, whereas cash benefits 
are estimated to rise to much lower degree. What at the same time gets evident here is a 
substantial range of possible developments, depending on how the respective parameters are 
set. 
One other projection presented GÖG in 2012 (see GÖG 2012) indicates lower expected 
increases in spending for LTC-services than the ones presented by Mühlberger et al. (2008). 
GÖG applied a number of assumptions on likely future measures of cost containment and 
increased efficiency within organisational structures of LTC services. According to their 
estimations, spending for LTC services is likely to rise by 43.3% between 2010 and 2025 (net 
spending for LTC services; middle scenario). 
What is clear irrespective of these different results of projections of future developments is 
the fact that public spending for LTC will have to rise substantially in the future even to 
sustain the current rate of coverage by formal care. Furthermore, as indicated by the huge 
variation of coverage rates between federal provinces, at least in some of them deficits in 
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formal care are already currently evident. The above mentioned long-term care fund, first 
introduced in 2011, is dedicated both to cover costs of the existing system and to enhance care 
services (especially of extramural care). However, given the limited amount of financial 
resources available from the long-term care fund and the huge differentiation of respective 
services already in place in the different federal provinces no far-reaching impact in sense of a 
standardization of the availability of LTC services is to be expected from the long-term care 
fund. In fact, it more is an instrument to safeguard the short-term financial feasibility of the 
structures already in place. Regarding the more long-term perspective, it is largely unclear 
how financial feasibility should be guaranteed in future. Yet, the most important stakeholders 
appear to agree that public spending for LTC services should as well in future remain to be 
financed via taxes, whereas the idea of a public LTC-insurance did not find many supporters 
(see below chapter 4.2.4). 
Regarding formal carers problems of shortage of availability and the question of unfavourable 
working conditions within this sector are long-standing issues in Austria. Over the last 
decade, several measures have been decided to improve the respective situation, but many 
challenges still prevail (see e.g. the report of the “Reform working Group Long-term Care” 
(Reformarbeitsgruppe Pflege), presented in December 2012 (Reformarbeitsgruppe Pflege 
2012). 
According to estimations by the “Reform working Group Long-term Care” 
(Reformarbeitsgruppe Pflege) the demand for formal care attendants within services and 
benefits in kind provided by the federal provinces will rise from ca. 45,000 full-time 
equivalents in 2010 to about 67,500 full-time equivalents in 2025 (see Table 7). At the same 
time it is fair to say that no clear cut and encompassing political strategy exists on how to 
increase the availability of qualified LTC personnel.  
 
Table 7: Projections for the number and structure of care attendants  
  2010 2025 Change in % 
Case- and Care-
management 160  300  +87.5  
Alternative 
Dwellings 2,750  4,500  +63.6  
Short-term 
inpatient care 285  700  +145.6  
Semi-Inpatient 
Services (Day-
Care) 325  750  +130.8  
Inpatient Services 30,135  43,100  +43.0  
Outpatient 
Services 11,500  18,300  +59.1  
Total 45,155  67,650  +49.8  
Source: Reformarbeitsgruppe Pflege (2012, 15). Based on cost-projections for LTC services by GÖG (2012). 
The future need for LTC is evidently not only influenced by demographic changes, but as 
well by the overall health condition of the growing number of elderly people. For this reason 
health prevention and rehabilitation is as well of major importance in the context of LTC. As 
already sketched out in the chapter on health (Chapter 3.2.2 above) health prevention appears 
to be one of the traditional weak points of the Austrian health system. Some positive steps 
have been taken on this point over the last years, but major challenges continue to exist (see 
Hofmarcher 2013, 189ff. for details).  
 




Long-term care cash benefits are not sufficient to cover the total costs of formal LTC services 
and for that reason additional private outlays and/or funding via the minimum income 
schemes of the federal provinces (and hereby the capitalisation of available private assets) are 
the norm in case that people in need for LTC/their families opt for more encompassing formal 
care arrangements. Furthermore, availability of formal care arrangements varies to a very 
large degree when the nine federal provinces are compared to each other. Overall, this leads to 
a situation where a rather large part of LTC is performed via informal care of family 
members, or – in some cases – friends and neighbours etc. 
Given the challenges of substantial regional differences of accessibility of services and 
respective quality assurance, a high rate of informal care (and potential related problems of 
quality and the conflicting goal of increasing formal employment of women), rising demand 
for LTC, shortages of qualified care personnel, and lacking financial sustainability the whole 
LTC system resembles a building site with many unsolved problems.    
4.3 Reform debates 
It is fair to say that challenges and problems of the current LTC system got more public and 
political attention in Austria over the last year. Furthermore, respective debates to some 
degree broadened in terms of content. In earlier years, respective public political statements 
on most cases had their focus on issues of cash the long-term care cash benefit (Pflegegeld) 
only, where opposition parties repeatedly criticized that this benefit does not get indexed for 
inflation in Austria on a regular basis. Then, towards the end of the first decade of the 2000s, 
the topic of so-called “24 hours care” at home very much dominated respective debates. 
Hereby, people in need of LTC are looked after by privately hired caretakers (at first instance 
from Eastern Europe; see Fink 2009, 20ff.; Bauer/Österle 2012; 2013), and this type of care 
arrangement originally in most cases was of the type of undeclared work, with then a black 
marked for such services evolving. Political decisions were made to legalize such care 
arrangements, whereby at the same time some minimum quality standards got stipulated and 
public financial subsidies were made available (see Bachinger 2009 and Österle 2013 
regarding regulation on “24 hours care at home”).  
The problems of financial feasibility regarding LTC services provided by the federal 
provinces and the municipalities, which got evident in 2010 and then lead to the introduction 
of the “long-term care fund” (see above chapter 4.1.3), provoked some more encompassing 
debates on the future of the LTC-system in Austria. A “reform working group on long term 
care” (Reformarbeitsgruppe Pflege; inter alia comprising of representatives of the Federal 
Republic, the federal provinces, the municipalities and different interest organisations) got 
introduced in 2011 and presented its’ results in December 2012 (see Reformarbeitsgruppe 
Pflege 2012). The suggestions of the above mentioned reform working group are not very 
concrete regarding a number of issues, which especially holds for the point of a structural 
organisational reform, asking for more harmonization
62
, but stating that this goal should be 
met via instruments of soft governance at first instance (increased information on the status 
quo, common goals on service supply and quality management, increased monitoring and 
evaluation etc.). Furthermore, the working group did not provide new models for public 
financing of long-term care. It only agreed that financing should come from general tax 
revenue, whereas it rejected the idea of a long-term care insurance, as this would lead to a 
further increase of non-wage labour costs (see Reformarbeitsgruppe Pflege 2012). 
                                                 
62
  See for an overview on this issue e.g. Österle 2013; Trukeschitz et al. 2013. 
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Overall, question of future organisation of long-term care is on the agenda to some degree, 
and the reform working group with its report at least helped to put some problems on the 
table. However, it is unclear if this will have a substantial effect on future developments in the 
field. Here, the most important retarding force, namely a fragmentation of competencies and 
accountability remains to be in place (see as well Österle 2013). This means that the 
implementation of the different suggestions made by the reform working group again asks for 
negotiations between the different stakeholders involved. Furthermore, if none of them takes 
over a kind of leading role, then it is very unlikely that respective reform procedures really 
gain momentum. 
Regarding long-term care, the country specific recommendation no. 4 postulates that Austria 
should “develop a financially sustainable model for the provision of long-term care and put a 
stronger focus on prevention, rehabilitation and independent living”.  
The new government programme clearly stipulates that in future more emphasis should be 
given to prevention, but it does not provide a clear-cut und integrated strategy to reach this 
goal (but only announces that it has to be made sure that the pension insurance provides 
rehabilitation measures for elderly people as from 2015). Regarding financing, the new 
government programme does not announce any new measures. On this background no strong 
arguments evolve why this CSR would have to be changed. 
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http://www.hauptverband.at/mediaDB/788530_Handbuch_der_oesterreichischen_Sozialversi
cherung.pdf 
“Handbook on the Austrian Social Insurance System 2010” 
 
This handbook informs about the development of Austria’s Social Security in 2010 and 
includes comprehensive data in the areas of health, pension and accident insurance, maternity 
benefits and long-term care benefits. It also gives an overview of legal modifications in social 
security law enacted in 2010. 
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Table 1. Spending on LTC according to System of Health Accounts (OECD)1) 1990 - 2011 
 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
 
in Mio EUR 











































5        Of which at-home care and long-term 
care cash benefits 





































1        Of which long-term care at isntitutions 
(and other spending) 














                       Private spending for long-term care 235 250 276 296 318 340 364 389 409 439 487 515 537 580 627 649 675 693 748 836 863 887 


























































































in % of GDP 
Public spending on long-term care total 0.78 0.75 0.74 0.90 1.12 1.11 1.06 1.05 1.07 1.10 1.07 1.06 1.04 1.05 1.06 1.07 1.06 1.05 1.11 1.26 1.28 1.28 
       Of which at-home care and long-term 
care cash benefits 
0.65 0.63 0.62 0.75 0.73 0.76 0.72 0.67 0.66 0.66 0.65 0.65 0.64 0.64 0.63 0.64 0.63 0.63 0.64 0.72 0.72 0.72 
       Of which long-term care at institutions 
(and other spending) 
0.12 0.12 0.13 0.15 0.39 0.34 0.34 0.38 0.41 0.44 0.42 0.41 0.40 0.41 0.42 0.43 0.43 0.42 0.47 0.55 0.55 0.56 
                       Private spending for long-term care 0.17 0.17 0.18 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.20 0.21 0.21 0.22 0.23 0.24 0.24 0.26 0.27 0.26 0.26 0.25 0.26 0.30 0.30 0.30 
                       Total spending for long-term care 0.95 0.92 0.92 1.08 1.31 1.30 1.26 1.27 1.28 1.32 1.30 1.30 1.29 1.31 1.33 1.33 1.32 1.31 1.38 1.56 1.58 1.57 
Source: STATISTIK AUSTRIA, version 31.01.2013; 
http://www.statistik.at/web_de/static/gesundheitsausgaben_in_oesterreich_laut_system_of_health_accounts_oecd_199_019701.xlsx & own calculations 1) Within the System of Health 
Accounts, spending for LTC for the case of Austria repeatedly derives from estimations, given a lack of sound empirical dat
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Table 2.  Spending on LTC-services according to the “Long-term Care Database” and 
spending for Long-term Care cash benefits (Pflegegeld) 
















6. Case- and 
Care-
management 






  Gross Spending (in EUR) 
Total 486,432,512  2,181,633,523  21,551,486  10,450,101  (158,333,624) 9,933,304  
Burgenland 6,726,803  50,603,642  349,220  - - - 
Carinthia 24,162,430  138,804,449  432,522  550,000  . 185,103  
Lower Austria 68,357,875  316,759,111  898,070  4,118,416  - 1,974,403  
Upper Austria 65,084,478  325,343,062  1,634,596  11,091  173,860  2,134,729  
Salzburg 17,995,390  90,544,771  629,380  233,216  - 864,467  
Styria 49,000,000  366,652,174  1,199,500  - 1,198,402  - 
Tyrol 26,914,206  130,998,917  831,622  420,266  - 235,227  
Vorarlberg 21,073,000  77,666,706  242,127  1,131,404  1,167,863  100,625  
Vienna 207,118,330  684,260,691  15,334,449  3,985,708  155,793,499  4,438,750  






  Net Spending (in EUR) 5) 
Total 314,764,696  1,140,154,640  18,432,337  6,178,384  (68,121,690) 9,585,716  
Burgenland 5,308,522  20,804,218  349,220  - - - 
Carinthia 19,332,430  63,485,204  432,522  550,000  . 185,103  
Lower Austria 40,525,597  147,887,178  898,070  2,118,416  - 1,974,403  
Upper Austria 44,539,758  140,166,535  1,391,854  6,963  52,792  2,132,094  
Salzburg 14,538,846  42,615,035  629,380  233,216  - 864,467  
Styria 30,200,000  201,997,846  645,000  - 753,580  - 
Tyrol 18,588,322  66,552,539  390,067  320,283  - 235,227  
Vorarlberg 9,884,903  43,386,143  242,127  765,840  514,692  100,625  
Vienna 131,846,319  413,259,942  13,454,096  2,183,666  66,800,626  4,093,797  






  GDP in Mio EUR 
  300,712 






  Gross Spending in % GDP 
Total 0.16176026 0.725489346 0.00716682 0.003475119 0.052652912 0.003303262 
  
  Net Spending in % GDP 
Total 0.104673141 0.379151693 0.006129565 0.002054585 0.022653466 0.003187673 






  Outpatient 
Services 





% GDP  




0.104673141 0.413176982 0.003187673 






  Spending for all benefits in kind/services provided by the federal provinces (sum of 1 to 6) 
Total Gross 
Spending in 













LTC spending for long-term care cash benefits by the federal state & the federal provinces 
in 2011 Federal state 






Total in Mio. 
EUR 
2,449.67 
Total in % 
GDP 
0.81 


















Source: STATISTIK AUSTRIA, Pflegedienstleistungsstatistik. Prepared 31.01.2013; & own calculations. 
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This publication is commissioned by the European Union Programme for Employment and 
Social Solidarity – PROGRESS (2007-2013) 
This programme is implemented by the European Commission. It was established to 
financially support the implementation of the objectives of the European Union in the 
employment, social affairs and equal opportunities area, and thereby contribute to the 
achievement of the Europe2020 Strategy goals in these fields. 
 
The seven-year Programme targets all stakeholders who can help shape the development of 
appropriate and effective employment and social legislation and policies, across the EU-27. 
EFTA-EEA and EU candidate and pre-candidate countries. 
 
For more information see: 
http://ec.europa.eu/progress 
 
 
